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THE DEATH PENALTY AND THE
WAY WE THINK NOW
R. George Wright*
I. INTRODUCTION
The death penalty is a matter of continuing fascination. Crit-
ics of the death penalty in contemporary American jurispru-
dence have claimed the inevitability of caprice and mistake' and
have pointed to racial and other biases in the imposition of the
death penalty.2  Currently, the death penalty in principle seems
acceptable to the Supreme Court3 and to the general populace.4
* Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University.
The author would like to thank Deborah Denno, Joshua Dressier, John Gar-
vey, Steve Garvey, Andy Klein, Nancy Levit, George Martinez, Jeffrie Mur-
phy, and Michael Perry, for their encouragement and exceptionally interesting
critiques.
1. See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE
INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE (2d ed. 1981).
2. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death
Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, With Re-
cent Findings From Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); John H.
Blume et al., Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases,
83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771 (1998); John C. McAdams, Racial Disparity and
the Death Penalty, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153 (1998) (from a special
issue on the ABA's proposed moratorium on the death penalty).
3. See, e.g., Earl Martin, Towards an Evolving Debate on the Decency of
Capital Punishment, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 84, 84 (1997) (noting that the
Supreme Court has sought, for more than two decades, to focus on narrower
procedural issues of implementation or, at most, on the constitutionality of the
death penalty as applied to particular classes of defendant, rather than to re-
examine the basic constitutionality of the death penalty itself).
4. See, e.g., William J. Bowers et al., A New Look at Public Opinion on
Capital Punishment: What Citizens and Legislators Prefer, 22 AM. J. CRIM. L.
77, 78-81 (1994) (citing apparently broad popular acceptance of the death pen-
alty, but arguing that "there is now solid evidence that the 'prevailing wisdom'
of 'strong,' 'deep-seated' public support for the death penalty is mistaken,"
given the general public's preference for a range of alternative sentencing pos-
sibilities). For discussion, see Nancy Levit, Expediting Death: Repressive Tol-
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The death penalty remains, however, controversial in many re-
spectsi
This Article focuses on the questions that are most central
to the basic moral justifiability of the death penalty in a society
like our own. We will thus assume, heroically,6 that the judicial pro-
cess of deciding to impose the death penalty could some-
how be made morally sound. Our concern will instead be for basic
principle, rather than process. If the death penalty process were
flawless, could the death penalty itself, under our social circum-
stances, 7 be morally objectionable?
erance and Post-Conviction Due Process Jurisprudence in Capital Cases, 59
UMKC L. REv. 55, 70-72 (1990).
5. See, e.g., Walter Berns et al., The Death Penalty: A Philosophical and
Theological Perspective, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 463 (1997) (illustrating
contrasting perspectives among the seven contributing panelists).
6. For critique of various aspects of the administration of the death pen-
alty, see Stephen B. Bright, Glimpses at a Dream Yet to Be Realized, 22
CHAMPION 12 (1998) (discussing common inadequacies in the legal represen-
tation of capital defendants); Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Exe-
cutions Constitutional?, 82 IowA L. REv. 319 (1997) (documenting the actual
operation of various means of execution in the context of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause); Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital
Punishment, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1670 (1986) (discussing racial and other biases
in the actual operation of the death penalty system, as distinct from the ideal-
ized version defended by many death penalty supporters); Jordan M. Steiker,
The Limits of Legal Language: Decisionmaking in Capital Cases, 94 MICH. L.
REv. 2590, 2594-95 (1996) (stating that post-Furman rejection of sole reliance
on either standards or discretion "has proven to be disastrous"). For a passion-
ate debate over the Supreme Court's current jurisprudential tests, compare
Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in denial of
certiorari); with id. at 1143, 1145 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of cer-
tiorari and announcing "[flrom this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with
the machinery of death").
7. Among our relevant social circumstances, we shall assume, is an enor-
mous economic surplus available for discretionary use, beyond mere subsis-
tence. Thus we shall assume that criminal punishments other than death are
not prohibitively expensive. We shall also assume the availability of advanced
communication and other sorts of technologies in our discussion of the varie-
ties of solitary confinement as alternatives to the death penalty. Finally, we
shall assume that even if the death penalty is a better criminal deterrent than
the best alternative punishments, the death penalty is not so dramatically supe-
rior in this respect as to make a crucial moral difference.
Whether the death penalty is a better criminal deterrent at all remains
open to question. See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 6, at 1675-80. For basic
philosophical discussion of some deterrence issues, see MICHAEL DAvIs,
THE DEATHPENALTY
Ultimately, we will conclude that the death penalty is, under our
social circumstances, not morally justifiable, even in principle. It is
not difficult to build an argument that, on its own terms, concludes
that we should reject the death penalty. The tricky part lies in ac-
commodating the ways of thinking of an era that is losing its com-
mon understanding of the meaning of making a moral claim in the
first place.8 We could not, for example, simply announce that we
have today intuitively grasped the unchanging Platonic form of jus-
tice, and that it is incompatible with the death penalty. 9 Such an ar-
gument would, to put it mildly, lack contemporary appeal.
Many of us are growing skeptical that claims about justice or
morality can be genuinely true or false. If our culture consistently
minimized the reality of moral claims in general, it would be difficult
to morally rule out the death penalty in all cases. After all, a howling
mob may, for example, actually gain more sheer utility from watch-
ing an execution than the convict, and anyone else, lose from the
JUSTICE IN THE SHADOW OF DEATH: RETHINKING CAPITAL AND LESSER
PUNISHMENTS chs. 1-2 (1996). In any event, most academics and citizens do
not seem disposed to defend or reject the death penalty primarily over deter-
rence issues. Compare David Dolinko, Some Thoughts About Retributivism,
101 ETHICS 537, 538 (1991) (citing Ernest van den Haag, The Death Penalty
Once More, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 957, 965 (1985) (defending the death pen-
alty "on grounds of justice alone")), with Henry Schwarzchild, Reflections on
Capital Punishment, 25 ISRAEL L. REv. 505, 507 (1991) (rejecting the death
penalty on moral grounds and noting that even if the death penalty "were de-
monstrably a uniquely effective deterrent to crime ... the moral issue would
not be differently resolved"). If the death penalty, as distinct from any other
penalty, were actually somehow necessary to literally save the world, our
minds might well change. However, we shall not assume this state of affairs to
be among our current social circumstances.
8. For discussion of current metaethical controversies and uncertainties,
see ALLAN GIBBARD, WISE CHOICES, APT FEELINGS: A THEORY OF
NORMATIVE JUDGMENT (1990); J. L. MACKIE, ETHICS: INVENTING RIGHT AND
WRONG (1977); NICHOLAS RESCHER, OBJECTIVITY: THE OBLIGATIONS OF
IMPERSONAL REASON (1997); RICHARD RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF
PRAGMATISM (1982); Stephen Darwall et al., Toward Fin de si~cle Ethics:
Some Trends, 101 PHIL. REV. 115 (1992).
9. Cf. Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth,
1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 25 n.121 (noting that "'[p]latonic forms' are no longer
credibly sought" because "their content or accuracy cannot be tested") (citing
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964 (1978)).
January 2000]
LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:533
punishment.'0 Sheer physical pleasure, as might be derived from
watching an execution, is closer to being self-justifying than any sort
of principled opposition to the death penalty. In a consistently mor-
ally skeptical world, it would be hard to rule out the death penalty.
Contemporary defenses of the death penalty, however, remain
more ambitious than mere skeptical appeals to attitudes, group pref-
erences, or to a balance of gratifications and frustrations. In particu-
lar, defenses of the death penalty typically assume that a criminal de-
fendant can be genuinely responsible or blameworthy for his or her
actions, and therefore, genuinely deserves a particular penalty" with
10. This is, of course, a rather tricky sort of calculation, and is subject to all
sorts of qualifications. For a vivid and reasonably plausible literary case, see
VICTOR HUGO, THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME 224-33 (Walter J. Cobb &
Phyllis La Farge trans., Penguin Signet Classic ed. 1965) (describing the public
legal punishment of Quasimodo).
11. While focusing on what the offender deserves does not thereby commit
one to the death penalty, the most important defenses of the death penalty rely
upon the idea of desert Focusing on desert is typically crucial to the broad and
popular family of retributive theories of punishment. For discussions of re-
tributivism, see generally ANDREw VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS
(1993) (arguing just deserts as the most plausible theory of punishment); Max
Atkinson, Interpreting Retributive Claims, 85 ETHICS 80, 83-84 (1974) (dis-
cussing desert of an evil return as one of three forms of retributivism); John G.
Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 239 (1979) (arguing
that desert theory is only one of nine distinct versions of retributivism); David
Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1623, 1623
(1992) (calling retributivism the "leading philosophical justification of the in-
stitution of criminal punishment"); Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain
From Heaven ": Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REv. 989, 1012
(1996) ("Retributivism holds that punishment is justified when it is de-
served."); Jean Hampton, Retribution and the Liberal State, 5 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 117, 124 (1994) (citing three forms of retributivism, in all of
which desert plays a crucial role); Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus
Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1659, 1659
(1992) (developing an "expressive" theory of retribution); Jeremy Waldron,
Lex Talionis, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 25 (1992) (discussing punishment as relevantly
similar to or matching the character of the offense). For commentary on
Hampton and on the work of Jeffrie Murphy, see Joshua Dressier, Hating
Criminals: How Can Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH. L.
REV. 1448 (1990). For commentary on von Hirsch in particular, see STEPHEN
NATHANSON, AN EYE FOR AN EYE?: THE MORALITY OF PUNISHING BY DEATH
75-77 (1987); David M. Adams, Fitting Punishment to Crime, 15 L. & PHIL.
407 (1996); Barry Pollack, Note, Deserts and Death: Limits on Maximum
Punishment, 44 RUTGERS L. REV. 985, 987 (1992) (adopting von Hirsch's des-
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the uniquely appropriate penalty of death in some cases. There is no
indication that when contemporary defenders of the death penalty
speak of deserving a certain punishment, they skeptically refer only
to attitudes, to mere group preferences, or to moral desert only as
some sort of social construct that depends completely on our collec-
tive choice of goals in having a system of punishment. 12 There is
thus not yet much of a morally skeptical, "beyond good and evir'
flavor to the contemporary death penalty debate.
Instead, defenders of the death penalty continue to 'refer to moral
desert as something real, and not infinitely subject to public ma-
nipulation.' 3 The death penalty is still thought to be "really" morally
right. Whatever inroads one form or another of moral skepticism
have elsewhere made, they have yet to influence the basic normative
debate over the death penalty. This may be merely a matter of the
gradualism of the triumph of moral skepticism. At least as likely,
however, is the possibility that in the context of the death penalty, no
variety of moral skepticism is particularly appealing. Skepticism
may seem less than fully satisfying when we must react to murder,
genocide, or rape, or when we consider executing a particular person.
In any event, the contemporary death penalty debate clearly en-
courages non-skeptical basic moral argument. I will present below
what I intend to be the least controversial argument that is still able
to rule out the death penalty as a matter of moral principle. The idea
ert framework). On retribution and capital punishment in particular, see, for
example, Robert S. Gerstein, Capital Punishment-"Cruel and Unusual"?: A
Retributivist Response, 85 ETHICS 75 (1974); Christopher Adams Thorn, Note,
Retribution Exclusive of Deterrence: An Insufficient Justification for Capital
Punishment, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 199 (1983). For broader discussion of theo-
ries of punishment in general, see, for example, MICHAEL MOORE, PLACING
BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 88 (1997) (arguing that
retributivism holds "that the moral desert of an offender is a sufficient reason to
punish him or her") (emphasis in original); THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT (Stanley
E. Grupp ed., 1971); Paul Campos, The Paradox of Punishment, 1992 Wis. L.
REv. 1931, 1931, 1935 (distinguishing between retributivist theories and con-
sequentialist or utilitarian theories and raising the possibility that genuinely re-
ciprocal punishment for unjust suffering might require not only just, but also
unjust, suffering in return); R.A. Duff, Penal Communications: Recent Work in
the Philosophy of Punishment, 20 CRIME & JUST. 1 (1996) (emphasizing an
approach to punishment as a communicative act).
12. See infra Part II1.A.
13. See infra Part I.A.
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thus is to steer between unnecessarily ambitious or otherwise contro-
versial moral claims, and moral claims that are more broadly accept-
able but that do not rule out the death penalty.
To briefly anticipate some of the arguments below, I hint at
three significant points. First, by way of a "softening up" operation,
I raise the possibility that the demands of moral desert, even for the
worst murderers, may be as well satisfied by some forms of life im-
prisonment and solitary confinement as by the death penalty. In par-
ticular, once I expand the understanding of the range of possible life
sentences and the nature of solitary confinement, the logical appro-
priateness of such sentences becomes evident. We can come to ap-
preciate that such sentences may even amount to more severe pun-
ishments, in the degree and duration of pain and suffering intended
and imposed, than the penalty of death. Thinking that punishments
other than death must be less appropriate reflects a failure of the so-
cial imagination.
Second, even if we were to concede that in some cases, death is
more deserved than any alternative sentence, the case for the death
penalty would not thereby be made. Desert is often an important
moral consideration, but it can and should be overridden in all con-
temporary death penalty cases by other moral considerations. We
need not argue that the death penalty is ever undeserved, unfair, un-
just, or violative of the defendant's moral rights. We should not, by
analogy, award a prize to the admittedly deserving winner of a race if
the prize itself turns out to be needed to somehow prevent serious
harm to another person---even to the loser of the race. The moral
overridability of desert can involve punishment as well as reward,
even though we ordinarily try to closely link sentencing to moral de-
sert.
Third, and relatedly, we are committed to sketch one or more
moral considerations, that operates in every case to limit the role of
desert, such that it is never morally appropriate to impose the death
penalty under contemporary circumstances. Since this is a "positive"
element of the case against the death penalty, and because it will be
useful to bear these positive considerations in mind, I will take up
this task first. Importantly, I will focus on a number of common
natural capacities shared by every person, no matter how evil, which
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comprises the mens rea or state of mind required for conviction of
any serious crime.
In particular, I will argue that deliberate murders require capaci-
ties such as sheer consciousness, a distinctive self-consciousness, a
continuing personal identity, and perhaps even a standard sort of
freedom of will by the defendant. These capacities are familiar and
widely shared. I argue, however, that these capacities, embodied in
unique, incomparable, and irreplaceable form in every rightly con-
victed defendant, are incomparably and irreplaceably valuable ca-
pacities, however wrongfully they may have been used. They are
valuable not merely because of their unique embodiment and relation
to the person, but because they are deeply, permanently, and ines-
capably mysterious in basic ways, entirely unlike anything else in the
natural order.'4 Preservation of these unique values, I argue, over-
rides even the assumed desert or fairness of death, at least as long as
other not substantially less appropriate punishments are available.
II. MENs REA AS DEEP MYSTERY: SOME POSIVE IMPLICATIONS OF
THE CAPACITY FOR LEGAL GuiLT
The death penalty might be thought appropriate for a broad or
narrow range of crimes.' 5 Respectable opinion, however, imposes a
14. It is perhaps possible to argue that life itself is as deeply and inescapa-
bly mysterious as, say, the existence and nature of consciousness. We need not
take a stand on this claim In any event, it would be paradoxical, if not self-
defeating, for the death penalty advocate to argue that because the lives of both
the victim and the murderer were mysterious and deeply valuable, the life of
the murderer should be extinguished as well. Of course, the hint of paradox is
never far from the general claim that murderers in particular should be subject
to execution. See, for example, the remarks of Judge Alex Kozinski in Alex
Kozinski & Stephen Bright, The Modem View of Capital Punishment, 34 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1353, 1355 (1997) (oral debate format). Judge Kozinski urges
that "it is entirely appropriate for society to deem some acts so evil, to be so
demeaning of human life, that we can say the perpetrator has forfeited his own
life by committing them" Id. Precisely how a trial, conviction, and execution
alchemically transforms the evil and demeaning act of an intentional killing by
a presumably evil defendant into the opposite has never been fully explained.
Nor, for that matter, has the language of "forfeiture" been explained in this
context.
15. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 600 (1977) (holding the
death penalty inappropriate for rape of an adult woman); Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (1910) (barring the death penalty for the crime of
January 2000]
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state of mind requirement on eligibility for the death penalty. 6 Let
us focus, merely for convenience, on the crime of murder. Surely,
most contemporary death penalty cases are associated with one form
or another of the crime of murder.' 7 Whether it is constitutionally
required or not,'5 the death sentence for murder clearly requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt' 9 of a distinctive state of mind.20
The precise formulation of the mens rea required for a death
sentence in a murder case varies slightly among jurisdictions. Those
variations, however, and even the different kinds of murder convic-
tions, are inconsequential for our purposes. Generally, premeditation
or deliberation is held minimally necessary for first-degree murder,
and consequently for the death penalty.21 Premeditation has been
robbery).
16. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 152-58 (1987) (holding that
major participation in a felony combined with reckless indifference to human
life satisfies the culpability requirement); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,
790-91 (1982) (requiring actors in a felony murder to have culpable mental
states).
17. See, e.g., Coker, 433 U.S. at 593-97 (discussing the historical context of
the death penalty).
18. See, e.g., Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 81-82 (1987); see also Ti-
son, 481 U.S. at 156-57 (holding mens rea required by "common law and
modem criminal codes").
19. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 484 (1895) (requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt of required mental state in murder prosecu-
tion).
20. See, e.g., authorities cited supra note 16.
21. See, e.g., People v. Cortez, 18 Cal. 4th 1223, 1232, 960 P.2d 537, 542,
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 733, 738 (1998) (defining premeditated and deliberate murder
as murder in the first degree); Green v. State, 715 So. 2d 940, 943 (Fla. 1998)
(distinguishing premeditation as the essential difference between first and sec-
ond-degree murder); State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 851-52 (Mo.) (en banc)
(distinguishing unimpassioned premeditation or deliberation as the difference
between first and second-degree murder), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 961 (1998);
State v. Owen, 503 S.E.2d 426, 431 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (requiring malice for
second-degree murder, but not premeditation and deliberation); Common-
wealth v. Brown, 711 A.2d 444, 449 (Pa. 1998) (distinguishing deliberate and
premeditated intent as required for first-degree murder); Commonwealth v.
Thomas, 717 A.2d 468, 474 (Pa. 1998) (same); Commonwealth v. Wayne, 720
A.2d 456, 460 (Pa. 1998) (same); Pender v. Angelone, 514 S.E.2d 756, 757
(Va. 1999) (finding premeditation or a specific intent to kill as the element
distinguishing first from second-degree murder). But ef State v. Lee, 501
S.E.2d 334, 344 (N.C. 1998) (stating that the absence of premeditated or delib-
erate intent to kill is irrelevant to the particular offense of first-degree murder
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held to require something akin to the thinking out of the prohibited
act beforehand,22 or, alternatively, something like the mental process
of reflection,23 weighing,24 reasoning,25 planning,26 or considera-
tion.27 Premeditation, however, does not require extended brooding
or prolonged reflection.28 The required mental state of premeditation
thus does not require any particular length of time,29 and may even
be nearly instantaneous.3 °
by torture); Stuckey v. Trent, 505 S.E.2d 417, 421 (W. Va. 1998) (distin-
guishing three categories of first-degree murder, including murder by poison-
ing, lying in wait, imprisonment, or starvation; murder in the course of arson,
rape, robbery, burglary, or the attempt thereof; and any deliberate and pre-
meditated killing). Of course, the underlying felonies for felony murder may
well have their own mens rea requirements. It is difficult to imagine any just
conviction for felony murder of one incapable of conscious and free decision-
making at the time of the offense.
22. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 467 S.E.2d 233, 234 (N.C. 1996) ("Premed-
itation means that the act was thought out beforehand for some length of
time .... "); State v. Saleem, 977 P.2d 921, 925 (Kan. 1999) (defining pre-
meditation as thinking the matter over beforehand).
23. See State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967, 992 (Wash. 1999) (en bane).
24. See id.
25. See id.; see also State v. Burkins, 973 P.2d 15, 22 (Wash. Ct. App.
1999).
26. See State v. Warren, 592 N.W.2d 440, 451 (Minn. 1999).
27. See id. The idea of malice aforethought is, of course, encountered fre-
quently. See, e.g., People v. Hart, 20 Cal. 4th 546, 608, 976 P.2d 683, 721, 85
Cal. Rptr. 2d 132, 170 (1999) (linking deliberation and premeditation with
malice aforethought); Commonwealth v. Maldonado, 709 N.E.2d 809, 813
(Mass. 1999).
28. See State v. Knese, 985 S.W.2d 759, 769 (Mo. 1999) (en banc), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 1814 (1999).
29. See People v. Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th 297, 332, 956 P.2d 374, 398, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 412, 436 (1998) (establishing test as one of extent, not duration), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct 1146 (1999); State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831, 841 (Mo.
1998) (en banc) (indicating that some amount of time, however short, is re-
quired for deliberate reflection), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 961 (1998); State v.
Cintron, 513 S.E.2d 794, 798 (N.C. Ct App. 1999) (same).
30. See State v. Brocks, 587 N.W.2d 37, 42 (Minn. 1998) (stating that a
virtually instantaneous formulation of a plan may suffice); Thomas v. State,
967 P.2d 1111, 1123 (Nev. 1998) (validating instantaneous premeditation),
cert. denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999); Commonwealth v. Hung
Tan Vo, 693 N.E.2d 1374, 1380 (Mass. 1998) (defining deliberate premedita-
tion as excluding any action performed without thinking about and then de-
ciding to do the action in question).
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Deliberation is often distinguished only hazily, if at all, from
premeditation. 31 Sometimes, deliberation is said to involve a par-
ticular form of premeditation. In other cases, premeditation is said
to involve deliberation.3 3 Deliberation may also be described in col-
orful, if not rigorously empirical or otherwise precise terms.34 But
the precise definitions of deliberation and premeditation, however
crucial in some death penalty cases, are a matter of indifference for
our purposes. Any recognizable definition, and in turn any standard
state of mind requirement for the death penalty, will suffice to make
my point.
The point can be expressed in this way: to be minimally eligible
for the death penalty, even the most villainous defendant's state of
mind must be something that is literally astonishing in nature and in-
extricably linked to a general kind of mental capacity that is, in all of
its diverse specific manifestations, of irreplaceable, indispensable,
and ultimately overriding moral value.
However I characterize the criminal mens rea that will suffice
for the death penalty to apply, some sort of mental consciousness,
genuine self-awareness, and mental reasoning process, however
evil the substantive choice, are inescapably required. This sort of
31. See, e.g., Bolin, 18 Cal. 4th at 332, 956 P.2d at 398, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d at
436 (seeking to distinguish, while linking, premeditation and deliberation);
State v. Thomas, 514 S.E.2d 486, 505-06 (N.C. 1999) (seeking to distinguish
among intent malice, premeditation, and deliberation); Commonwealth v.
Wayne, 720 A.2d 456, 465 (Pa. 1998) (treating premeditation and deliberation
as separate elements, but failing to define the difference), cert. denied, 68
U.S.L.W. 3224 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999).
32. See Maldonado, 709 N.E.2d at 813 (referring to deliberate premedita-
tion); Hung Tan Vo, 693 N.E.2d at 1380 (same); Rousan, 961 S.W.2d at 841
(defining deliberation as unimpassioned premeditation).
33. See State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967, 991-92 (Wash. 1999) (en bane), cert.
denied, 68 U.S.L.W. 3232 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1999); State v. Burkins, 973 P.2d 15,
22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999) (defining premeditation as "the deliberate formation
of and reflection upon the intent to take a human life").
34. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 467 S.E.2d 233, 234 (N.C. 1996) (stating that
"[d]eliberation means an intent to kill, carried out in a cool state of blood, in
furtherance of a fixed design for revenge or to accomplish an unlawful purpose
and not under the influence of a violent passion, suddenly aroused by lawful or
just cause or legal provocation") (quoting State v. Conner, 440 S.E.2d 826,
835-36 (N.C. 1994)). On one reading, deliberation is compatible with hot-
bloodedness, as long as the hot-bloodedness bespeaks legally insufficient
provocation.
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consciousness is, in some sense, both widely shared and the most
familiar sort of experience.3 5 The intimate familiarity of conscious-
ness unfortunately desensitizes its astonishing and deep mysterious-
ness.
3 6
The same point may be made in any of a variety of terms,
whether we refer to consciousness, 37 conscious reasoning,38 deci-
sionmaking and choice,39 the continuity of the person,
4° inner life, 41
conscious experience, 42 subjectivity,43 the mind,44 mental states, 45 or
35. See, e.g., Steven Pinker, Silicon Souls, TIMES (London), Jan. 31, 1999,
at 6, available in 1999 WL 7901308 ("[O]ur 'own' consciousness, the most
obvious thing there is, may be for ever beyond our conceptual grasp.").
36. See, e.g., DANIEL C. DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS EXPLAINED 22 (1991)
("Consciousness stands alone today as a topic that often leaves even the most
sophisticated thinkers tongue-tied and confused. And ... there are many who
insist-and hope-that there will never be a demystification of conscious-
ness."). As Professor Dennett reminds us, we should bear in mind the distinc-
tion between two important but separate issues: is it possible to successfully
demystify consciousness, and if so, would that demystification ultimately lead
to a society and the sorts of personal relationships that would be desirable?
See id. at 22-25.
37. See, e.g., COLIN McGINN, THE MYSTERIOUS FLAME 5 (1999) ("IT]he
bond between the mind and the brain is a deep mystery. Moreover, it is an ul-
timate mystery, a mystery that human intelligence will never unravel.").
McGinn, however, views this unresolvability as philosophically uninteresting,
in that he believes it to be merely an artifact of insuperable human cognitive
limitations. See id. at 70. The idea that people are simply ill-equipped to un-
derstand consciousness can hardly be ruled out but is no less dogmatic than
any other highly speculative hypothesis. And there may remain a sense of
paradox, as opposed to naturalness, associated with the outcome that people
may be able to understand every interesting natural phenomenon except for
consciousness.
38. See, e.g., DAVID HODGSON, THE MIND MATTERS: CONSCIOUSNESS AND
CHOICE IN A QUANTUM WORLD 426 (1991). Quantum effects are often
speculatively cited as potentially involved in conscious choice and free will.
See David Hodgson, Nonlocality, Local Indeterminism, and Consciousness, 9
RATIO 1, 1 (1996); ROGER PENROSE, THE EMPEROR'S NEW MIND:
CONCERNING COMPUTERS, MINDS, AND THE LAWS OF PHYSICS (1989).
39. See HODGSON, supra note 38, at 426.
40. See id.
41. See, e.g., MICHAEL LOCKWOOD, MIND, BRAIN AND THE QUANTUM 1
(1989); see also DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A
FUNDAMENTAL THEORY xi (1996) (referring to "a subjective inner life").
42. See, e.g., David J. Chalmers, The Puzzle of Conscious Experience (last
modified June 1999) <http://ling.ucsc.edu/-chalmers/papers/puzzle.html> (re-
ferring to "conscious experience"); THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 166
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conscious intelligence.46 Whatever the precise focus, the deep and
evidently permanent mystery remains.
One leading contemporary writer puts the matter in these terms:
Consciousness is the biggest mystery. It may be the largest
outstanding obstacle in our quest for a scientific under-
standing of the universe .... It still seems utterly mysteri-
ous that the causation of behavior should be accompanied
by a subjective inner life.... How could a physical system
such as a brain also be an experiencer? Why should there
be something it is like to be such a system? Present-day
scientific theories hardly touch the really difficult questions
about consciousness. We do not just lack a detailed theory;
we are entirely in the dark about how consciousness fits
into the natural order.47
Or the matter may be put this way: "The very idea of con-
sciousness materializing, of subjectivity being realized in the activity
of a physical organism, is puzzling. The rich phenomenology of the
conscious stream and complex neural phenomena appear to belong to
two different orders: the subjective and the objective., 48 Or, more
simply, "[t]he mystery is how... the construction of brains, of com-
plicated collections of purely physical particles, gives rise to some-




43. See, e.g., THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE 7, 15 (1986).
44. See, e.g., id. at 16.
45. See, e.g., NAGEL, supra note 42, at 167.
46. See, e.g., PAUL M. CHURCHLAND, MATTER AND CONSCIOUSNESS 1
(rev. ed. 1998).
47. CHALMERS, supra note 41, at xi (emphasis in original). This is not to
suggest that there is no mystery associated with ordinary physical objects, such
as electrons, lumps of coal, or brains. Although we understand atoms or brains
and brain activity much better today than we did a hundred years ago, it would
be much more controversial to say that we understand mind itself or the nature
of consciousness in a similarly progressive way. For the view that matter and
mind are roughly equally mysterious, see Galen Strawson, Little Gray Cells,
N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999, § 7, at 13 (reviewing COLIN McGINN, THE
MYSTERIOUS FLAME (1999)).
48. OWEN FLANAGAN, CONSCIOUSNESS RECONSIDERED xi (1992).
49. KEITH WARD, GOD, CHANCE & NECESSITY 147 (1996). Professor
Ward, in fact, concludes that "[c]onsciousness is... a mystery that biology can
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None of this suggests that we cannot make dramatic progress in
understanding the many dimensions of consciousness. Conscious-
ness may be thought of as perhaps conferring survival advantages,50
as an "emergent property" of brain function, 51 as only scientifically
axiomatic and not explainable, 52 or as analogous to some favored
never solve .... ." Id.
50. See, e.g., JOHNR SEARLE, THE REDISCOVERY OF THE MIND 107 (1992)
("Consciousness gives us much greater powers of discrimination than [we
would otherwise] have."). But cf GALEN STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND BELIEF
146 (1986) (noting the possibility of non-conscious behaviors, including ran-
domization, that make prediction difficult). More broadly, Searle argues that
consciousness is not genuinely separate from the relevant physical systems,
and only "seems mysterious because we do not know how the system of neu-
rophysiology/consciousness works, and an adequate knowledge of how it
works would remove the mystery." SEARLE, supra, at 102. But cf. McGNN,
supra note 37, at 81-82; RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 173
(1979) ("[T]here are no scientific laws correlating the bodily and the mental,
only correlations of too limited a scope to constitute laws."). More broadly,
see RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUL (rev. ed. 1997).
Whether consciousness confers any significant survival advantages, and is in
those terms therefore explainable, is entirely beside the point The nature of
consciousness itself remains utterly mysterious. Consider a very loose anal-
ogy. If people had natural teleportation powers, such that they could hurl
predators aside, or if people could mentally generate protective force fields
impenetrable by predators, they could easily account for the persistence of
these traits through their survival value. However, an account of their survival
value would not begin to explain how they can teleport objects or mentally
generate force fields. The adaptiveness of these capacities explains their
propagation, but hardly their nature, or how they operate.
51. Again, if the subjective mental phenomena were an emergent property
of fully understood electrons, that would hardly dissolve the mystery of con-
sciousness.
52. See, e.g., David J. Chalmers, Facing Up to the Problem of Conscious-
ness (last modified June 1999) <http://ling.ucsc.edu/-chalmers/papers/
facing.html> (taking conscious experience as itself fundamental). It is fair, and
perhaps necessary, to take one or a few entities as explanatorily fundamental,
and therefore themselves not subject to explanation. In this way, an ancient
geometer might take the idea of an infinitesimal point as fundamental. People
should be reluctant, however, to take what looks like the hardest, deepest, and
most fascinating problem, and simply turn the phenomenon into an axiom.
People should give up only on pseudo-problems, not problems apparently be-
yond our capacities. Or if they do give up on the apparently unsolvable, they
should not reclassify it as neither solvable nor unsolvable, but as axiomatic. It
is true, of course, that people do not criticize cosmologists for their inability to
explain why there is something rather than nothing. But that is because the
problem of existence-at-all is at least hard, or an interdisciplinary problem, not
January 2000]
546 LOYOLA OFLOSANGELESLAWREVIEW [Vol. 33:533
model of a sophisticated technical apparatus or of information proc-
essing.53 None of these perspectives, however valuable, cogently
addresses or diminishes what is genuinely mysterious about con-
sciousness. Nor is there any clear reason to believe that future sci-
entific progress along various fronts will fundamentally change this
state of affairs. 4
Consciousness, it seems fair to say, is thus shared by every can-
didate eligible for the death penalty, and is both intimately familiar
and deeply-apparently intractably-mysterious. But it must be
admitted that not every puzzling phenomenon carries moral weight.
That we cannot figure something out does not mean that it is morally
valuable. It is unclear, for example, how a moving particle can seem
to do without trajectories, or can exist in a mysterious "blur" or su-
perposition of quantum possibilities that then resolves itself into a
single state of affairs.55 We do not, however, attach much moral
weight to every particle that can exhibit this behavior. We would not
grieve over the loss of a photon. Admittedly, mystery alone does not
bestow moral weight.
because it is an ill-formulated or muddled pseudo-problem.
53. It is currently attractive to account for even some of the mind's deepest
mysteries through analogy to computers and computer software. For a skepti-
cal view, see NAGEL, supra note 43, at 16 ("[Glurrent attempts to understand
the mind by analogy with man-made computers... will be recognized as a gi-
gantic waste of time."). For perspective, see ANTHONY KENNY, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MIND 107 (1989) ("We humans are always inclined to ex-
plain things we only imperfectly understand in terms of the most advanced
technology of the age we live in.").
54. See LOCKWOOD, supra note 41, at 1 ("One must avoid the mistake of
thinking that this is simply a matter of scientists not yet knowing enough about
how the brain functions, in physico-chemical terms. For it seems clear that
more knowledge of the same general kind that neuroscience currently offers
could not-in principle could not-shed any further light on the fundamental
problem that consciousness raises."). Of course, one important further mystery
is whether consciousness somehow survives death. It is certainly possible to
argue that consciousness survives death in some way, so that consciousness in
its known form is all that is lost by execution. No position need be taken on
this issue, as it would seem that any official state reliance on an afterlife would
raise serious establishment clause problems.
55. For a discussion of these and other issues, see NICK HERBERT,
QUANTUM REALITY: BEYOND THE NEW PHYSICS (1985); R. George Wright,
Should the Law Reflect the World?: Lessons For Legal Theory From Quantum
Mechanics, 18 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 855 (1990) (exploring the linkage between
quantum mechanics and contemporary legal theory).
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Consciousness, however, is not just deeply mysterious. It is
largely constitutive of who we are, as distinctive individuals and as
moral persons in general. It is crucial to all what we do that is of any
moral status. Without it, we are amoral complex robots. Further, the
mystery of consciousness contains the even deeper mystery of self-
consciousness. Our consciousness is, in part, a consciousness of our
own subjective inner life.56 Consciousness can exist without self-
consciousness;57 it is self-consciousness that actually deepens the
mystery, and links the mystery directly to our very identity and to
our continuing, existing personhood and moral personality.
Consider the subtle distinctions drawn by the philosopher Galen
Strawson. Strawson observes that when we refer to genuine self-
consciousness, we do not refer merely to "consciousness of some-
thing that is in fact oneself."58 A dog observing its paw or a kitten
chasing its tail may meet the latter definition, but Strawson calls this
mere "mental reflexivity" 59  as opposed to genuine self-
consciousness. 60 The kitten, according to Strawson, is conscious of
something that is-belongs to, or is part of-itself, but is supposedly
not conscious of the fact that what it is conscious of is in fact itself 6'
The kitten in some limited way apprehends what is in fact itself, but
does not appreciate that which it apprehends is indeed itself.62
Strawson concludes that persons, in contrast--presumably in-
cluding death row inmates-have this deeper capacity for gen-
uine self-consciousness. 63  And from here, the level of mystery
deepens yet again. Strawson argues that it is this capacity for
56. See, e.g., LOCKWOOD, supra note 41, at 1 (commenting on the extraor-
dinary capacity of the brain to sustain an "innerlife").
57. See, e.g., STRAWSON, supra note 50, at 146-47.
58. Id. at 146.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 146-47.
61. See id. at 146.
62. See id. Holding other animals to lower or no moral standards implies
essentially nothing about how benevolently any species of animal must be
treated, or how much the continued existence of a species is worth. See also
TOM REGAN, ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS (2d ed. 1989) (dis-
cussing the ethics of human treatment of non-human animals); PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION (1977) (discussing the tyranny of human over non-
human animals).
63. See STRAwsoN, supra note 50, at 147.
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self-consciousness that is central to the claim, however ultimately
sound or mistaken, that we are capable of acting as free agents, by
means of free and responsible deliberation and choice, or free will.64
More broadly, the mystery of consciousness may be linked to
the deeply mysterious and often quite highly valued capacity for
freedom of the will. As one contemporary philosopher has put it:
"brain-type arrangements of elementary particles do give rise to
some rather extraordinary phenomena, most notably, conscious expe-
rience; thus it doesn't seem to me at all implausible to suppose that
they give rise to undetermined and appropriately non-random [i.e.,
freely-willed] decisions. ' 65
Obviously, the existence and nature of free will are philosophi-
cally controversial. 66 But this does not mean that every question as-
sociated with free will must be equally controversial. We may, for
example, posit a view of what life and society would eventually be
like if we believed free will not to exist.67 And as a practical matter,
we are apparently still willing to ascribe free will to most persons ac-
cused of serious crimes, including murders. 68 A criminal defendant
64. See id.; see also ROBERT KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL 148
(1996) ("[H]ow can thoughts, sensations, perceptions, or any other conscious
events--including efforts of will and choices-be at the same time physical
processes of the brain? This is a problem whether you are a compatibilist or
incompatibilist [on free will and determinism] or whether you think brain pro-
cesses are determined or not"); TED HONDERICH, How FREE ARE You?: THE
DETERMINISM PROBLEM 19 ("The question of the mind-brain connection is
about the best and hardest one in the philosophy of mind .... It is also one
question at the centre of determinism and freedom.").
65. Mark Balaguer, Libertarianism As a Scientifically Respectable View, 93
PHIL. STUD. 189, 203 (1999).
66. See, e.g., RICHARD DOUBLE, THE NoN-REALITY OF FREE WILL (1991);
TED HONDERICH, A THEORY OF DETERMINISM: THE MIND, NEUROSCIENCE,
AND LIFE-HoPES (1988); KANE, supra note 64; PETER VAN INWAGEN, AN
ESSAY ON FREE WILL (1986).
67. See, e.g., STRAWSON, supra note 50, at 219 n.22.
68. See, e.g., John T. Noonan, Jr., Horses of the Night: Harris v. Vasquez,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1011, 1025 (1993) ("The criminal law depends on a belief in
free will."); Joseph D. Grano, Ascertaining the Truth, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
1061, 1063 (1992) ("[C]riminal law is premised on a foundation of individual
free will and responsibility."); Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Crimi-
nal Responsibility: Free Will or Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 615
(1988) ("[T]he general presumption in the criminal law is that behavior is a
consequence of free will."); Meir Dan-Cohen, Responsibility and the Bounda-
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who does not establish insanity, duress, or other relevant excuse or
mitigating factor will be credited with the capacity for free will.
69
Whatever philosophic doubts we may have about free will do not
extend to murder defendants who cannot show an individualized im-
pairment.
70
But the free will we recognize in all convicted capital defen-
dants is not just deeply mysterious and deeply personal, but of im-
mense moral value. Pico della Mirandola eloquently argued in this
regard that the nature of all other creatures is externally defined and
imposed,71 but by virtue of free will, human nature is not thus limited
and imposed, and may be shaped by persons themselves.72 Persons
are thus, because of their free will, uniquely able to transcend their
nature and their subjection to nature. Persons may retain this capac-
ity even if they exercise that capacity in the most reprehensible way.
ries of the Self, 105 HARV. L. REV. 959, 1003 (1992) (discussing mens rea and
criminal excuses as approaching the Kantian model of unencumbered rational
free will); Ronald J. Rychlak & Joseph F. Rychlak, Mental Health Experts On
Trial: Free Will and Determinism in the Courtroom, 100 W. VA. L. REv. 193,
196-98 (1997); Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L.
REv. 1091, 1109 (1985). The leading death penalty theorist, Immanuel Kant,
stated that "[t]he human will is an arbitrium liberum in that it is not determined
by stimuli, but the animal will is an arbitrium brutum and not liberum because
it can be determined per stimulos." IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON ETHICS
28 (Louis Infield trans., Torchbook ed., Harper & Row 1963) (1930).
69. See sources cited supra note 68 and accompanying text.
70. Consider Professor Herbert Packer's view that the criminal justice sys-
tem in this respect exhibits more short-term pragmatic appeal than deep logical
consistency or fairness: "[T]he law treats man's conduct as autonomous and
willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed as if it were."
HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74-75 (1968).
Ultimately, we trust that any legal system that insists on morally blaming and
stigmatizing convicted defendants, including capital defendants, while no
longer believing in the existence of the logical requisites of just that sort of
blame and stigma, will prove unstable. Ultimately, the idea of holding persons
blameworthy because it is merely pragmatically convenient to do so will not
suffice. Either we will re-embrace a serious version of free will and moral re-
sponsibility, or we will embrace a more thorough pragmatism and drop the
pretense of blaming defendants. The eventual fate of capital punishment, in-
terestingly, is uncertain under either alternative.
71. See GIoVANNI PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, ORATION ON THE DIGNITY OF
MAN 7 (A. Robert Caponigri trans., 1956).
72. See id.
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Things might have been otherwise, in imagination if not in real-
ity. Free will may be an illusion. We may be, or at least might have
been, "marionettes moved by the causes at the other ends of the
strings., 73 Of course, if we are puppets, we are unusually complex
puppets, whose behavior is sometimes quite difficult to predict. Our
"software" is immensely sophisticated.7" But a complex puppet is
still nothing more than a puppet. The fact that much of our pro-
gramming is inconspicuous and under our skin, rather than in a sepa-
rate centralized mainframe, is of no deep philosophical significance.
Hand puppets are no more interesting, and ultimately no more valu-
able, than marionettes."
The possession of genuine free will, as is currently assumed in
the case of every defendant condemned to death, is of dramatic moral
significance.76 The moral significance of having free will may be
even greater than previously suggested. It may well be that there can
be no genuine morality at all, involving moral praise, blame, and
genuine moral responsibility, as opposed to a manipulative system
of incentives for favored and disfavored behavior, in the absence of
free will.77 Free will may ultimately be necessary for genuine crea-
tivity, genuine self-worth, genuine individuality, and other crucial
73. ROBERTNOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 310 (1981).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. The dispute between compatibilism and incompatibilism need not be
reached, however. Compatibilism comes in many versions, but accepting
those versions that recognize genuine freedom of the will does not necessarily
conflict with holding that such freedom of the will is compatible with causal
determinism. See, e.g., Richard Foley, Compatibilism, 87 MIND 421 (1978);
Alison McIntyre, Compatibilists Could Have Done Otherwise: Responsibility
and Negative Agency, 103 PHIL. REV. 453 (1994); Michael S. Moore, Causa-
tion and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1129-32 (1985); Stephen J.
Morse, Brain and Blame, 84 GEO. L.J. 527 (1996). Compatibilism is intended
to avoid some of the apparent incoherencies of the non-deterministic, libertar-
ian position in a largely causal world, but in practice it may be no easier to co-
herently state a genuinely compatibilist view than a purely libertarian view.
There is a tendency for some compatibilists to resolve theoretical tensions by
maintaining the terminology of free will, while abandoning genuine free will in
substance. Nevertheless, libertarians and genuine compatibilists both ordinar-
ily attribute valuable free will to rightly convicted capital defendants.
77. See, e.g., STRAWSON, supra note 50, at 219 n.22; PETER VAN INWAGEN,
METAPHYSICS 198 (1993); R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DOES THE LAW MORALLY
BIND THE POOR? 90-101 (1996).
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dimensions of human experience.78 Free will may be crucial to any
real sense in which a person can make a real moral difference. The
very capacity for free will, as distinct from freely choosing to act
rightly, may even be, according to some, of cosmic significance.79
The immense moral value and status of consciousness, self-
consciousness, and the sort of free will attributed to convicted capital
defendants have long been appreciated outside the death penalty
context. Aristotle, for example, attaches enormous significance to
the capacity to reason, or to initiate chains of reasoned thought. 80 In
fact, the highest form of such activity, which Aristotle calls contem-
plation, is thought as literally divine.81 As one commentator ex-
plains, "[s]ince intuitive reason is in man and God is intuitive reason
there is a divine element in man .... This element is thought to
be genuinely divine, and not divine only by some loose analogy.
83
This capacity is present in all persons.84 Elsewhere, Aristotle argues
78. See RIcHARD DOUBLE, METAPHILOSOPHY AND FREE WILL 160 (1996)
(discussing ROBERT KANE, THE SIGNIFICANCE OF FREE WILL (1996)). It is
useful to insert the qualifier of "genuine" in this context, in an attempt to fore-
stall the practice of abandoning the substance of a concept while retaining the
familiar label, and bestowing the label on some radically watered-down phe-
nomenon. In some extremely loose sense, one might "blame" or "hold respon-
sible" a complex mechanical robot for some unattractive activity.
79. The existence and immense value of free will is a crucial response to
the claim that a benevolent and omnipotent God would not permit as much suf-
fering as actually observed. See, e.g., Alvin Plantinga, God, Evil, and the
Metaphysics of Freedom, in THE EVIDENTIAL ARGUMENT FROM EVIL 69, 85
(Daniel Howard-Snyder ed., 1996). For our purposes, it is worth noting that a
sort of "rubber-roonf' freedom, in which one is free to choose only from
among harmless or benevolent, as opposed to both benevolent and criminal
acts, would be less serious, less dignified, and less valuable. This is, of course,
not to suggest that a society should not do all it reasonably and morally can to
reduce the incidence of homicides, consistent with properly valuing free will.
This would be one proper application of free will.
80. See ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHIcs Book I, 1098al-6, at 16-17
(Martin Oswald trans., Macmillan Publishing Co. 1962).
81. See id. atBookX, 1177b28-1178a3, at330-31.
82. J.O. URMSON, ARISTOTLE's ETHICS 122 (1988).
83. See id. ("[T]here is in us a divine element, not something resembling
it"); see also A.E. TAYLOR, ARISTOTLE 99 (rev. ed., 1955) (1919); SARAH
BROADIE, ETHICS WITH ARISTOTLE 415 (1991).
84. See URMSON, supra note 82, at 122 ("Because the divine is not spatially
located it is able to be present in all men."). This is not to suggest that Aris-
totle was an egalitarian. One must keep in mind that the mens rea required of a
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in addition that "[m]ind is then of one kind in virtue of its becoming
everything. . . ."85 This also suggests the immense moral status of
mind in action.
Aristotle, of course, is not alone in his valuation of the free and
deliberative self-consciousness. 86  Aristotle himself drew upon
capital defendant is, in a real sense, genuinely remarkable. It is possible to ar-
gue that it is the same shared divine element that is in all of us, and that this
homogeneous divine element in some fashion survives the execution of the de-
fendant. Under this approach, executing a convicted criminal would, in this
respect, be no great loss. The law, however, does not rely on an afterlife of the
soul. Nor does the law treat persons, or convicted criminals, as merely fungi-
ble mutual substitutes, or as merely participating jointly in a single shared
mind. Especially in death penalty cases, the law is sensitive to the distinctive
individuality of the person and to the uniqueness of personal circumstance.
See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 119 S. Ct. 2090, 2097 n.4 (1999); Buchanan
v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-79 (1998); Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1,
6-7 (1994); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 304-06 (1987). Nor would a
criminal defendant be allowed to offer an excuse that denies the unique, indi-
vidual value of the victim in the case. See Jones, 19 S. Ct. at 2105-2108. The
prosecution or the defense is not generally permitted to argue that the survival
of any person compensates for or negates the death of another. Cf David J.
Novak, Anatomy of a Federal Death Penalty Prosecution: A Primer for Prose-
cutors, 50 S.C. L. REV. 645, 669-73 (1999) (discussing what prosecutors may
introduce into evidence and how to counter a defendant's mitigating factors).
It may be that it is morally better to save many persons than to save few,
or that one innocent person should die rather than let an entire civilization per-
ish. None of this, however, establishes that the value of the capacity for con-
scious and deliberate free choice is fungible, replaceable, commensurable, or
less than unique. If the consciousness of individual victims are non-fungible--
and we seem to believe so-the individual consciousness of their murderers
are equally so. Indeed, we even treat inanimate artworks as uniquely valuable,
irreplaceable, and non-fungible in this sense. If a vandal destroys a Renoir, we
do not conclude that the loss is only modest, on the grounds that there are
plenty of other pieces of valuable art still in existence, or that there are other
Renoirs. Both a murder and an execution involve the loss, in the same sense,
of an irreplaceable world. One cannot justify either an unauthorized or state-
authorized intentional killing on the grounds that many different kinds of con-
scious, free persons remain alive.
85. ARISTOTLE, ON THE SOUL 430a14-16, at 171 (W.S. Hett trans., rev. ed.
1957). Admittedly, this observation may refer more directly to the mind in
general, as opposed to the unique minds of unique individuals. The logic of the
plasticity and creativity of mind applies clearly, and occasionally spectacularly,
to each individual mind.
86. This essay takes no position on the moral status of animals who lack
self-consciousness or the capacity to deliberate freely. There are, of course,
strong, separate, and independent reasons for not killing such animals or sub-
THE DEATHPENALTY
Plato's dramatic claim that "the soul of every man [and woman] does
possess the power of learning the truth and the organ to see it
with.",8 7 Following Aristotle closely, Augustine later argues that "the
soul of a beast is nobler than that ... which only exists without living
or understanding. Again, that which includes existence, life, and un-
derstanding, such as the rational mind of man, is nobler still."88
For Thomas Aquinas, following Aristotle, that all persons have
dignity, or non-dependent worth,89 stems not only from our existence
at the level of stars or planets, and plants and lions, but as well as
from our unique ability to exercise rational choice in action.90 We
grasp this intrinsic worth in every person's being.9' Later, Pascal
similarly observes that "[a]ll bodies, the firmament, the stars, the
earth and its kingdoms are not worth the least of minds, for it knows
them all and itself too, while bodies know nothing. 9 2 This tradition
continues through the great Humanists, 93 and on up to the present
day.
94
jecting them to pain and suffering. See, e.g., TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL RIGHTS AND HUMAN OBLIGATIONS (2d ed. 1989); PETER SINGER,
ANIMAL LIBERATION (1977); see also authorities cited supra note 62.
87. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC Book VIII, at 232 (Francis M. Cornford trans.,
1941) (1974) (making this statement in the context of the Allegory of the
Cave).
88. ST. AUGUSTINE, THE PROBLEM OF FREE CHOICE Book II, 6.13, at 91
(Dom Mark Pontifex trans., 1955). For the disclaimer regarding the status of
animals in general, see supra note 86.
89. See JOHN FIN s, AQUINAS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LEGAL THEORY
179 (Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
90. See id.
91. See id. at 180.
92. PASCAL, PENSEES 125 (A.J. Krailsheimer trans., 1966).
93. See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET 1604, reprinted in THE
COMPLETE WORKS 750 (Stanley Wells et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1986)
("[W]hat a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason, how infinite in fac-
ulty ... in apprehension how like a god.... ."); see also MIRANDOLA, supra
note 71, at 7. For an illuminating contrast, see FYODOR DOSTOEVSKY, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT 59 (Constance Gamett trans., 1981) (1866) ("[B]esides,
what value has the life of that sickly, stupid, ill-natured old woman in the bal-
ance of existence? No more than the life of a louse, of a black-beetle, less in
fact because the old woman is doing harm. She is wearing out the lives of oth-
ers .... Of course she does not deserve to live, remarked the officer .... ).
94. Professor Jonathan Glover quotes George Orwell with the remarkable
dictum "[O]ne mind less, one world less." JONATHAN GLOVER, CAUSING
DEATH AND SAVING LIVES 228 (1977). In particular, we note how Orwell's
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III. THE CENTRAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE DEATH PENALTY
A. Past and Present Thomistic Natural Law Theory
The great theorists of human dignity or the value of conscious
mind have not doubted the death penalty's moral status. Thomas
Aquinas, for example, forthrightly endorses the death penalty under
broad circumstances. Aquinas argues along the following lines:
Now every individual person is compared to the whole
community, as part to whole. Therefore if a man is danger-
ous and infectious to the [other members], on account of
some sin, it is praiseworthy and advantageous that he be
killed in order to safeguard the common good, since a little
leaven corrupted the whole lump.95
Aquinas explains that:
By sinning man departs from the order of reason, and con-
sequently falls away from the dignity of his manhood, in so
far as he is naturally free, and exists for himself, and he
falls into the slavish state of the beasts, to be disposed of
according as he is useful to others .... Hence, although it
be evil in itself to kill a man so long as he preserve his dig-
nity, yet it may be good to kill a man who has sinned, even
as it is to kill a beast. For a bad man is worse than a beast,
and is more harmful .... 96
formulation undercuts any sense that either the life of a murder victim, or the
life of a murder defendant, is somehow fungible or subject to replacement by
any life equally as good. For further appreciation of the unique, irreplaceable
value of each human personality, see FINNIS, supra note 89, at 178 (explaining
the importance of human psyche and soul); Robert A. Pugsley, A Retributivist
Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1501, 1515-16
(1981). As food for thought, consider the hypothetical case raised in ROBERT
KANE, THROUGH THE MORAL MAZE: SEARCHING FOR ABSOLUTE VALUES IN A
PLURALISTIC WORLD 75-77 (1994); see also R. George Wright, Consenting
Adults: The Problem of Enhancing Human Dignity Non-Coercively, 75 B.U. L.
REv. 1397, 1400 (1995).
95. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA II (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., 1929), reprinted in FRANCISCO DE VITORIA,
REFLECTION ON HOMICIDE & COMMENTARY ON SUMMA THEOLOGIAE II-II q.
64, 240 (John P. Doyle trans., 1997).
96. Id. at240-41.
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In our cultural context, it is difficult to see these arguments as
either consistent with Aquinas's own major principles or as a con-
vincing moral justification for the death penalty. The assumedly
dangerous and infectious murderer, for example, could today be af-
fordably placed into partial or virtually total isolation, temporarily or
permanently, and be publicly denounced, if not subjected to corporal
punishment, all falling short of the death penalty. Death is thus sim-
ply not necessary for Aquinas's cited purpose, even if we assume
that executing someone ends his harmful social influence.
The Thomistic argument that a sinful and presumably illegal act
reduces the defendant to the level of a beast fares no better. Some of
the most obvious death penalty cases--such as treason resulting in
the death of one's comrades-are not particularly bestial. More im-
portantly, however, there is an obvious and inescapable tension be-
tween the claim that the worst murders cause the forfeiture of human
dignity and a descent to the beasts on the one hand, and a stringent
mens rea requirement for the death penalty on the other.
97
To say that the defendant, at the time of the offense, was oper-
ating at a sub-human, animalistic level,9 and yet engaged in pre-
meditation and deliberation or malice aforethought is to indulge in
patent self-contradiction. Aquinas did not mean that murders cannot
be rationally planned in a way incapable to beasts. Nor can he mean
that a condemnee who has supposedly reduced himself to the sub-
rational level of mere beast could be treated in any socially useful
way, as for food consumption.
99
Doubtlessly, a truly evil person is morally worse than the most
destructive beast. A mob enforcer who sets fire to an uncooperative
business place is quite worse than a cow that starts a fire resulting in
the same damage. The cow cannot, presumably, be morally bad at
all, unlike the arsonist. The arsonist has freely and rationally exer-
cised his powers of deliberation and choice for immoral ends. He
can be morally worse than the beast because he possesses capacities,
for good or evil, which exalt him far above the beast. This only
starts, rather than ends, the death penalty debate.
97. See supra notes 19-34 and accompanying text.
98. See FnNIs, supra note 89, at 280-81.
99. For further critique of Aquinas's position, see id. at 281-84.
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However generously interpreted, Aquinas's attempt to find a ra-
tional and moral justification of the death penalty fails. But some,
though hardly all,100 of Aquinas's contemporary admirers adhere to
something similar to a Thomistic defense of capital punishment un-
der limited circumstances.' 0 ' Much of the debate among contempo-
rary Thomists on the moral status of capital punishment, however,
focuses on the special problem of interpreting the Thomistic doctrine
of an action's possible "double effect.'
0 2
In particular, this further Thomistic-inspired debate focuses on
whether imposing the death penalty involves intentionally killing the
condemnee as an instrumental means to further retributive justice, or
whether instead the execution simply manifests retributive justice.'13
The death penalty would presumably be permissible only under the
second description, and not under the first, with the common ground
being that the death penalty would always be wrong if it amounted to
taking a life only as a means to some desirable end.'
0 4
100. See, e.g., Germain Grisez, Toward a Consistent Natural-Law Ethics of
Killing, 15 AM. J. JURis. 64, 67-70 (1970).
101. See, e.g., JOHN FINNIS, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICS 126-33 (1983). For
a statement regarding this dispute among contemporary Thomists, see JOHN
FINNIS ET AL., NUCLEAR DETERRENCE, MORALITY AND REALISM 317 (1987).
102. See AQUINAS, supra note 95, art. 7, at 248. Aquinas holds that:
"[N]othing hinders one act from having two effects, only one of which is in-
tended [whether as an end or as a means], while the other is beside the inten-
tion." Id. The intended effect and not the unintended effect, however well
foreseen or even certain and inevitable, is what generally gives the act its pri-
mary moral character. See id. In particular, "the act of self-defence may have
two effects, one is the [presumably intended and legitimizing] saving of one's
life, the other is the [arguably somehow unintended if quite predictable] slay-
ing of the aggressor." Id. The legitimacy of this act of self-defense is also
subject to a further test of "proportionality," which often refers to something
like an act's moral legitimacy in all other relevant respects, rather than to any
sort of utilitarian balance of pains and pleasures. For further discussion of the
principle of double effect, see Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., Toward an Understanding
of the Principle of Double Effect, 90 ETHICS 527 (1980); Nancy Davis, The
Doctrine of Double Effect: Problems of Interpretation, 65 PAC. PHIL. Q. 107
(1984); Warren S. Quinn, Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doc-
trine ofDouble Effect, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 334 (1989); Suzanne M. Uniacke,
The Doctrine ofDouble Effect, 48 THOMIST 188 (1984).
103. See FINNIS, ET AL., supra note 101, at 317; see also FINNIS, supra note
89, at 279-80 (discussing the use of the death penalty as manifestation of re-
tributivist justice).
104. See FINNIS, ET AL., supra note 101, at 317. The Thomists are thus
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Assume that capital punishment can be inflicted for reasons
apart from its usefulness as a means of, for example, deterring future
crime, or communicating some message to the community. The state
might believe, as does Professor John Finnis,10 5 that the death pen-
alty is intended as simply an act of retributive justice that responds
justly to a prior criminal act. The death penalty is thus a self-
contained act or at most one that looks backward toward the crimi-
nal's act, and not forward toward achieving some future goal. The
death penalty could therefore in itself establish or implement jus-
tice.
10 6
There is, however, a basic problem with this approach to justi-
fying the death penalty. Whether or not this approach violates the
principle of double effect is perhaps difficult to decide, but is really
of little consequence. The basic problem instead is that it is deeply
question-begging. To say, as Professor Finnis does, that the death
penalty may, in some cases, bring or restore retributive justice is
simply a controversial moral conclusion. It is not itself a moral justi-
fication or even a moral argument for the death penalty.
united in opposing the death penalty as a means of gratifying public frustration,
or sending a message, or generally deterring future criminal acts. All of these
rationales would involve the state in directly attacking the fundamental good of
life as a means to some further end, whatever the moral character of that de-
sired further end.
105. See JOHN FINNIs, FUNDAMENTALS OF ETHICs 128-33 (1983). But see
FINNIS, supra note 89, at 282, 293 n.C (rejecting the argument that modem
capital punishment can be seen as the direct instantiation of the good of justice
rather than the choice of an immoral means to a good end).
106. See FINNIs, supra note 105, at 129-30. Gerard V. Bradley argues that
premodern societies might differ from our own, in that premodern societies
might intend only their own defense from grave danger in executing a criminal,
given the absence of any other adequate means of societal self-protection. See
GERARD V. BRADLEY, No INTENTIONAL KILLING WHATSOEVER: THE CASE OF
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, in NATURAL LAW AND MORAL INQUIRY 155, 168
(Robert P. George ed., 1998). In passing, we should note the potential for
broad abuse in the double effect principle's allowance for this redescription of
intention. Few murderers care about the death of their victim, as opposed to
some lawful aim which, for reasons beyond the murderer's control, might not
be achievable by any means short of actually killing the victim. We cannot
allow M to say that in murdering V, he intended only to put a sure and perma-
nent stop to V's nagging by the only effective means available, and did not
also intend V's death, however much he may have foreseen V's inevitable de-
mise. Any regret on M's part or any disproportionality of M's act, is irrelevant
to this point.
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We can thus respond to Finnis by saying, for example, that the
death penalty does not restore justice of any sort, because we happen
to think that it is unjust in the same respect that Finnis thinks it is
just. Or we can say that even if the death penalty can be retributively
just, it is nonetheless immoral in some overridingly important way.
Of course, to say that the death penalty is unjust or immoral hardly
shows that it really is unjust or immoral. But Finnis's crucial ques-
tion-begging is thereby at least made clear. Both Finnis and the op-
ponent of the death penalty must offer responsive arguments as to
how capital punishment is or is not immoral. For current purposes,
the upshot is that Professor Finnis cannot merely announce that the
death penalty establishes justice, without addressing the reasons why
it might instead be morally impermissible in all cases.
B. Kant and Hegel on the Death Penalty
The historical death penalty advocate with the greatest contem-
porary influence is probably Immanuel Kant. 0 7 This does not mean
that the thrust of Kant's defense of capital or other forms of punish-
ment is particularly clear.'08 Kant's defense of capital punishment is
107. Much of Kant's moral, political, and legal philosophy could be said to
bear indirectly on the logic and justification of the death penalty, but the single
most directly relevant source is IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF
MORALS 140-45 (Mary Gregor trans., 1991).
108. Compare Douglas Lind, Kant on Criminal Punishment, 19 J. PHIL. RES.
61 (1994) (describing Kant as a retributivist) and Leon Pearl, A Case Against
the Kantian Retributivist Theory of Punishment: A Response to Professor Pug-
sley, 11 HOFSTRA L. REv. 273, 274 (1982) (describing Kant as holding "that
only a retributivist theory is properly responsive to the criminal's dignity as a
rational agent capable of moral conduct") with Jeifrie G. Murphy, Does Kant
Have a Theory of Punishment?, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 509, 509 (1987) ("It is no
longer clear to me to what extent it is proper to continue thinking of Kant as a
paradigm retributivist in the theory of punishment.") (citing, inter alia, Jeffrie
G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973)) and
Vernon Thomas Sarver, Kant's Purported Social Contract and the Death Pen-
alty, 31 J. VALUE INQUIRY 455 (1997) (describing Kant as apparently in some
relevant respects a social contract theorist) and B. Sharon Byrd, Kant's Theory
ofPunishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution in its Execution, 8 LAw &
PHIL. 151 (1989) (describing Kant's theory of punishment as thus bifurcated in
nature). See also Sarver, supra, at 458 (describing Kant's punishment for
murder as ignoring his focus on the public insecurity caused by the murder in
favor of correspondence with the act itself).
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as vague, imagistic, metaphorical, and rhetorical as any call for its
abolition. Kant's approach is actually superficially and fundamen-
tally self-contradictory.
Kant begins by defining punishment in terms of a ruler's right to
inflict pain. 0 9 Because Kant holds that the death penalty is, with
certain odd exceptions,"0 absolutely required for all murderers,"'
the penalty of death would seem to be more a strict matter of public
duty than of public right. But this is partly over terminology. We
may also wonder about Kant's definitional link of punishment to the
infliction of pain." 2 Would a painless execution, carried out in oth-
erwise appropriate fashion, offer no punishment at all? Would an
intelligent and morally responsible person who is invulnerable to
pain not be subject to punishment, even if duly incarcerated for
twenty years? It is certainly possible to interpret Kant as referring to
the typical case, in which pain is quite certainly a factor. But this
will still not suffice. We could still retain the institution of punish-
ment, as in the form of the deprivation of life or liberty for blame-
worthy criminal acts, even if people were all invulnerable to pain.
While these preliminary sorts of problems hardly show that
there is anything wrong with Kant's account of capital punish-
ment, they do suggest that Kant's theory in general does not flow
109. See KANT, supra note 107, at 140.
110. It turns out that the death penalty may be inappropriate in cases of kill-
ing a fellow soldier in a duel or where a mother kills her nonmarital child. See
id. at 144-45. Kant explains that the nonmarital child may be ignored by the
law, as it was born outside the law and has metaphorically infiltrated the com-
monwealth without authorization. See id. at 145. Kant does not discuss
whether there is a chronological age at which this logic ceases to apply. This
problem arises because there is presumably no age at which one ceases to have
been born impermissibly, and thus outside the protection of the law. Kant is
thinking in particular of the mother's presumed shame and dishonor in being
known, presumably at any later time, to have given birth to a nonmarital child.
See id. But in light of the broad assumption that the child is outside the pro-
tection of the law, it is actually unclear why such a child could not be killed by
anyone without the murderer evading at least the penalty of death, or, for that
matter, why the same general logic should not apply to anyone who kills a per-
son who is intentionally present within the commonwealth illegally. Kant is
thus clearly not above massaging general principles in accordance with his
own cultural and personal intuitions as to what is appropriate.
111. See id. at142.
112. See id. at 140.
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rigorously from uncontroversial premises. Kant argues, for example,
that the kind and amount of punishment in a given case must reflect
"the principle of equality."'" 3 Kant explains this principle by assert-
ing that "whatever undeserved evil you inflict upon another..., you
inflict upon yourself."' 1 4 We shall of course assume that Kant actu-
ally means that punishment is deserved, whether the punishment it-
self is an evil or not. In any event, Kant concludes that the death
penalty is the only suitable response to murder."15
Kant's crucial argument is that "[t]here is no similarity between
life, however wretched it may be, and death, hence no likeness be-
tween the crime and the retribution unless death is judicially carried
out upon the wrongdoer ...."16 Of course, as previously discussed,
Kant does not really believe the death penalty is appropriate for all
premeditated murders, let alone for all types of murders. 17  Cer-
tainly, our own system of jurisprudence does not consider all mur-
derers to deserve death. 1 8 Nor can Kant possibly believe that, in
general, the punishment for serious crimes such as espionage, false
imprisonment, skyjacking, forgery, or tax evasion, should somehow
113. Id. at 141.
114. Id. Of course, one might question the equality or proportionality of the
death penalty where the victims and murderers differ radically in the most
elemental circumstances of life, including age. See, e.g., Igor Primorac, Life
for Life: Arguments Against Capital Punishment, 29 PHIL. STUD. (Ireland) 186,
189 (1982); Lawrence Crocker, The Upper Limit of Just Punishment, 41
EMORY L.J. 1059, 1081-82 (1992) (contrasting a two-year-old and a ninety-
five-year-old victim).
115. See KANT, supra note 107, at 142.
116. Id.; see also Lind, supra note 108, at 64 (explaining Kant's law of retri-
bution). Actually, Kant seems a bit unsure as to whether the likeness or pro-
portionality is supposed to be between the crime itself and the punishment, or
the crime along with the defendant's state of mind and the punishment.
117. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (Supp. 1999) (describing hearing to deter-
mine justifiability of death sentence in a given case); CAL. PENAL CODE §
190.3 (West 1998) (containing requirements for death penalty and life impris-
onment in homicide cases); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (West 1997) (detailing
consideration of possible mitigating circumstances); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
ch. 720, 5/9-1 (West 1998) (listing exceptions to the death penalty); TEx.
CRIM. P. CODE ANN. art. 37.071 (West 1996) (detailing consideration of pos-
sible mitigating circumstances in capital case procedure); VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-264.4 (Michie 1997) (listing various possible mitigating circumstances in
a sentence proceeding); see also authorities cited supra note 21.
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mimic or parallel the underlying crime. Thus, why should there be
perhaps any crimes-false imprisonment, for instance-in which
there must be at least a rough physical correspondence between
crime and punishment?
The equivalence between murder and the death penalty may be
rather crude. The state does not insist on an eye for an eye, however
equivalent the crime and punishment. A twenty-year-old might de-
liberately murder a dying ninety-year-old, or vice versa. A murderer
might kill one or many persons. Kant must at least insist that there is
no similarity, 119 and no clear commensurability, between life and
death. This is Kant's crucial point. But it is a point that is at best
equivocal. The unbridgeable gulf between death and life helps ex-
plain why society considers murder a serious crime, and why many
think that a term of imprisonment, of whatever length, is an inade-
quate response to murder. The same unbridgeable gulf between life
and death, however, also means that only in cases of capital punish-
ment, the state itself deliberately and premeditatedly extinguishes a
unique, irreplaceable embodiment of the deepest and most valuable
mysteries in the common human experience. The incomparability of
life and death explains why murder is wrong, and why capital pun-
ishment is wrong, even when the condemned murderer but not the
condemning state is evil.
Certainly, Kant does argue that the murderer has manifested in-
ner wickedness 120 in the act of murder, whereas the state in the act of
capital punishment does not. It is certainly true that some murderers,
though hardly all, know or believe their acts to be morally wrong,
while the state believes all instances of capital punishment to be
morally justified, at least at the time of execution.12 ' But this only
shows that the state's own mens rea typically differs from that of the
119. See KANT, supra note 107, at 142. Hegel argues similarly that "since
life is the full compass of a man's existence, the punishment [for murder]
•.. can consist only in taking away a second life." HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT 247 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967). Hegel's formulation usefully, if unin-
tentionally, raises the possibility that what is most deeply wrong about murder
may also be inescapably relevant to the moral quality of capital punishment
120. See KANT, supra note 107, at 142.
121. Of course, the state is on notice of the possibility of mistake and the
statistical evidence for racial and other bias in the imposition of the death pen-
alty. See authorities cited supra note 2.
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murderer, and that the condemning state should be credited with
subjective innocence or good faith. Good faith, however, hardly
shows that the act of execution is morally justified from an objective
standpoint.
Kant is the first to admit that the worst kinds of crimes should
not be matched with the worst penalties imaginable. If capital pun-
ishment is assigned for some murderers, Kant does not want society
to respond to mass murderers with capital punishment following, for
example, prolonged torture,122 time in the stocks, or a criminal fine.
Yet if a new crime were invented that is much worse than any crime
heretofore imagined, it is certain that the state would respond not
only with great severity, but with an immoral punishment.
At some point, it becomes morally wrong for the state to try to
legitimately emulate or parallel the degree of severity, pain infliction,
wickedness, depravity, or inhumanity displayed by the convicted de-
fendant. At some point, the proposed penalty will be morally wrong
for the reasons previously suggested. That point is reached with the
imposition of the penalty of death.
An important mistake made by Kant, and by other defenders of
the death penalty, is the focus on what the convicted murderer mor-
ally deserves. What the murderer deserves is not the only relevant
moral constraint on criminal punishment. Let it be simply stipulated
that a particular convicted murderer deserves the death penalty. This
may be stated in other ways. In a given case, it may be conceded
that the death penalty is not an unfair punishment in light of the
crime the defendant committed. In such a case, the death penalty
may be just because the condemnee has forfeited all of his relevant
rights due to his wickedness. All this can be true.
But saying that capital punishment is morally deserved, or fair,
or just, or not violative of the defendant's rights does not exhaust the
relevant moral considerations. A penalty may, for example, be de-
served, but there may be independent moral considerations dictating
122. Consider Leibniz's rhetorical question: "Can an assassin who has cut
the throats of a hundred passers-by... be condemned more and punished
more, in proportion... ?" LEIBNIZ, POLITICAL WRITINGS 167 n.* (Patrick
Riley trans., 2d ed. 1972) (describing the cruel ability among extremely evil
men). Kant explicitly prohibits mistreatment of persons sentenced to death.
See KANT, supra note 107, at 142.
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that all things considered, it would nevertheless be morally wrong to
impose that penalty. Clear cases of both deserved rewards and de-
served penalties may be postulated in which this is the case.
Consider, for example, a case in which a particular child has
won a race fairly, and therefore deserves the small prize specified in
advance. Are there, in such a case, any moral considerations that
could possibly trump the child's desert? Clearly there are. Suppose,
however oddly, that the prize turns out to be the only means of buy-
ing bottled water for a seriously dehydrated losing contestant. It is
only now remembered that the prize was solemnly promised earlier
to some third party.
Deserved rewards are not exclusively subject to moral override.
Deserved penalties can be overridable as well. Suppose a student's
paper deserves a failing grade, but the grader knows that a failing
grade means that the student would then be made an involuntary hu-
man sacrifice. 123 In such a case, not giving the deserved penalty in
the form of a failing grade, is not merely morally permissible, but
morally required. Nor would the analysis change if the deserved
123. We may assume that no replacement human sacrifice would then be
selected. For real and hypothetical examples in which, for one reason or an-
other, we might choose not to punish the deserving, or at least not to punish the
deserving in full accord with their deserts, see Douglas N. Husak, Why Punish
the Deserving?, 26 Nous 447, 448-49 (1992). See also Jeffrey H. Reiman,
Justice, Civilization, and the Death Penalty: Answering van den Haag, 14
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 115, 134 (1985) (stating that "from the fact that something
is justly deserved, it does not automatically follow that it should be done, since
there may be other moral reasons for not doing it such that, all told, the weight
of moral reasons swings the balance against proceeding" and finding a coun-
terbalancing civilizing mission in abolishing the death penalty). Our argument
does not rely on a civilizing mission in abolishing the death penalty, but we
certainly do not need to object to Reiman's argument in this respect. It might
certainly be argued that there is a difference between deserving a prize or a
grade and deserving to be executed, with the latter desert being "deeper" or
less contractually based. Giving or withholding from a student a deserved
grade, however, seems to have non-contractual elements as well. It is also
readily argued that where we do not give persons what they deserve, we should
in some, if not all, cases mark that discrepancy and perhaps attempt some sort
of moral compensation. It seems, though, that we can accommodate this intui-
tion in the case of not executing those who deserve to die. Presumably, some
aspect of their treatment, or the way we regard such persons, could be adjusted
to appropriately reflect that such persons are thought to deserve execution.
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penalty were more severe, such as permanent expulsion from school
as opposed to a failing grade on a single paper.
Also, the analysis would not change if the reason for overriding
a deserved serious penalty were systematic and uniform, or even
universal. Suppose as a universal and unalterable law of nature that
even the most deserved failing grades cause serious cardiovascular
damage. There would arise a moral imperative to devise some viable
alternative system of student evaluation for use in all cases. The fact
that a given student's failure was due entirely to that student's own
free, deliberate, and premeditated decisions would, in such a case,
not change the result.
Thus, 'even if we could devise a fully coherent Kantian account
of deserving the penalty of death, as opposed to any alternative pun-
ishment, such a theory would still be morally inadequate. Even if a
defendant clearly deserves the penalty of death, and such a penalty
would be fair, just, and not violative of the defendant's rights, the
state could still be invariably and uniformly barred, under standard
social conditions, from imposing such a penalty by independent
moral considerations of the sort discussed thus far.
A basically Kantian argument could, however, be pushed a bit
more aggressively, as it is by Hegel. In Hegel's view, "punishment
is regarded as containing the criminal's right and hence by being
punished he is honoured as a rational being."'124 Hegel thus goes be-
yond saying merely that capital punishment does not violate the con-
demnee's rights. Instead, the condemnee has a moral right to be
punished, presumably with death. Thus, the death penalty is linked
to honoring the condemnee's rational capacities.
125
Hegel's modifications of the basic Kantian theory of capital
punishment do not, however, make much difference in the end. As-
sume that the convicted defendant has a moral right to be punished.
The problem is that having a moral right to be punished does not
imply that it is, all things considered, morally right to punish the
defendant, capitally or otherwise. After all, not all moral rights
are absolute and utterly inviolable. Some are merely prima facie or
124. HEGEL, supra note 119, at 71.
125. See id.
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defeasible. 126 Some rights are easily overridden. A person's as-
sumed moral right to not be lied to may be overridden in cases of
moral necessity, or even to avoid hurt feelings, or the spoiling of a
surprise.
Hegel would have to offer a convincing account of why the con-
victed criminal's moral right is nearly absolute, and not merely prima
facie. We might note that the constitutional free speech and free ex-
ercise rights of prisoners are hardly absolute. 127 Why shouldn't the
prisoner's right to be executed be overridable, at least occasionally?
And if at least occasionally, Hegel has then opened the door to the
argument for always overriding that right on moral grounds.
Whether a right is merely prima facie or not, it certainly may be
waivable or alienable. Any moral rights inherent in a promise may
be waived merely by releasing the promisor. 21 Criminal defendants
certainly can waive various constitutional rights. 129 It is all the more
clear that most "honors,"'130 as Hegel refers to execution, can be de-
clined. Academy Awards can be rejected in advance. One would
expect that many condemnees would be inclined to freely and vol-
untarily waive their moral right to be executed, as opposed to endur-
ing some other severe, long-term punishment. Why is this right
thought to be unwaivable? We can only suspect that Hegel must at
this point rely on, and add nothing to, Kant's question-begging as-
sumption that only death is a morally fitting response to a murder.
Hegel's rather imperious solicitude for the supposed rights of the
murderer adds little.
The basic question-begging nature of the Kantian account of
the death penalty cannot be resolved through the language of the
126. See, e.g., RICHARD B. BRANDT, ETHICAL THEORY 437-39 (1959); see
also George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REv. 949,
978-80 (1985).
127. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 350-53 (1987)
(discussing free exercise); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84-91 (1987) (dis-
cussing free speech).
128. Thus, one's moral right to a promised performance may ordinarily be
waived at the promisee's sheer arbitrary discretion. For a legal analogue, see
Hubacheck v. Estate ofBrown, 148 N.W. 121, 122 (Minn. 1914).
129. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966); State v.
Johnson, 988 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Mo. Ct App. 1999); Calvert v. State, 726 So.
2d 228, 232 (Miss. Ct App. 1998).
130. HEGEL, supra note 119, at71.
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condemnee's rights. Recall that Kant has defined punishment itself
in terms of the state's right,13 1 not of the criminal's right, and has de-
fined punishment specifically in terms of the infliction of pain. 32 In
response, we need not claim that there can be no moral right that is,
by definition, intended to be painful for the rightholder. We need
only claim that if there is an absolute, non-waivable, intentionally
painful moral right, such a right would be so odd that explaining and
justifying such a paradoxical right would require nearly all the argu-
ment that would be needed to justify the death penalty without any
reliance on the condemnee's rights. The reference to the con-
demnee's rights simply does not help.
C. The Contemporary Theory of Ernest van den Haag
The leading contemporary American advocate of the death pen-
alty who was strongly influenced by the Kantian-Hegelian approach
is probably Ernest van den Haag.133 Professor Van den Haag main-
tains the Kantian-Hegelian focus on what the convicted criminal de-
serves, or at least on arriving at a punishment that somehow roughly
matches or corresponds to the criminal's own acts. 34 He argues, in
131. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
133. Van den Haag's numerous relevant works include: ERNEST VAN DEN
HAAG & JoHN P. CONRAD, THE DEATH PENALTY: A DEBATE (1983); ERNEST
VAN DEN HAAG, THE DEATH PENALTY ONCE MORE, in THE DEATH PENALTY
IN AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIES 445 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1997), re-
printed in 18 U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 957 (1985); Ernest van den Haag, For
Capital Punishment, 25 ISRAEL L. REV. 460 (1991); Ernest van den Haag,
Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1250 (1987) (re-
viewing ANDREW VON HIRsCH, PAST OR FuTuRE CRIMES (1985)); Ernest van
den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, 14 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 165 (1985);
Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1662 (1986).
134. See Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99
HARv. L. REv. 1662, 1663 (1986) (arguing, in the context of the question of
the possible maldistribution of capital punishment; that "[tihe only relevant
question is: does the person to be executed deserve the punishment?"). But
see Ernest van den Haag, Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1250, 1254 (1987) (book review) ("But what does murder deserve in the
first place? Execution? Life in prison? Twenty years? Ten? Just deserts the-
ory cannot tell."); see also id. at 1256 ("[T]he just deserts principle does not
prescribe a scale of penalties, or enable us to do so, beyond suggesting that
punishments must be felt to be deserved, that is, felt somehow to retribute (pay
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particular, that unlike most other crimes, 3 5 the principal effect of
murder is "irreversible and irrevocable."' 136 Correspondingly, "[t]he
death penalty has these characteristics as well. Thus it seems to fit
murder."1
37
Of course, any homicide, whether faultless, negligent, or some-
how intentional, is equally irreversible. So irreversibility cannot help
us much in finding even an admittedly rough 13s correspondence be-
tween crime and punishment. Professor Van den Haag relies instead
on the culturally common intuitive sense that for at least some mur-
ders, nothing less than the death penalty is somehow suitable, given
our sense of analogy and proportion.
139
What can be said to further validate the rough collective intui-
tion upon which Van den Haag's conclusion rests? Professor Van
den Haag argues in particular that the death penalty is not degrad-
ing,140 that a life sentence, as opposed to execution, can become un-
deserved over time,141 and that execution can be both deserved' 42 and
not excessively severe.' 43 These principles, it is believed, allow us to
back) for the moral and material injuries crimes cause .... There need not be
an equivalence of suffering. Retribution is circumscribed, albeit vaguely, only
by our sense of proportion."). It would seem that the logic of the death penalty
in fact reduces to the admittedly haziest of cultural intuitions.
135. Professor Van den Haag does not argue, however, that other crimes
with irreversible and irrevocable principal effects deserve death. Nor does he
argue that a crime such as treason, whose effects might be reversible, should
not be subject to the death penalty.
136. Van den Haag, For Capital Punishment, supra note 133, at 461.
137. Id. Of course, there are other possible punishments that can be brutally
permanent, but Van den Haag does not endorse such possibilities.
138. See supra note 134.
139. See Van den Haag, For Capital Punishment, supra note 133, at 461.
140. See Van den Haag, THE DEATH PENALTY ONCE MORE, supra note 133,
at 968-70. The intended contrast here is preeminently with Justice Brennan's
analysis of the death penalty in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 271
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[T]he primary principle is that a punishment
must not be so severe as to be degrading to the dignity of human beings."). In
our view, the death penalty for minor crimes would be too severe, but need not
be degrading or undignified.
141. See Van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, supra note 133, at
172-73.
142. See VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 133, at 454.
143. See id.; see also Louis Pojman, In Defense of the Death Penalty, 11
INT. J. APPLIED PHIL. 11, 11 (1997) (referring to Nuremberg war criminals)
("[D]eath was too good for these moral monsters. The gravity of their crime
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roughly triangulate upon the penalty of death in some cases, at least
as closely as the subject matter admits. In reality, though, these prin-
ciples are of little help. Let us briefly address each in turn.
First, we need not claim that the death penalty is degrading.
Common forms of execution may be considered degrading by
some.144 But not all executions, at least in theory, need be degrading,
in the sense of tending to humiliate or reduce the standing and dig-
nity of the condemnee, or being so intended. This is, however, ir-
relevant to the basic objection raised to capital punishment. An exe-
cution may be deserved, fair, just, rights-respecting, and even
intended to honor the condemnee. 45 An execution that is intended to
honor the condemnee, or at least his rationality, may not be degrad-
ing.146 But a dignified and non-degrading execution in this sense
may still be immoral for other reasons.
The basic problem with capital punishment, again, is not one of
degradation, but of extinction. A unique, irreplaceable locus of im-
mense mystery and value, in the form of a particular consciousness,
self-consciousness, and active free will, is simply annihilated, how-
ever dignified the method. It is not as though capital punishment
turns consciousness merely into some humiliating shadow of its for-
mer self. Rather, it utterly abolishes a conscious self. To go from
existing to not existing need not be degrading. But going from ex-
isting to not existing does entail the complete loss of whatever value
was associated with the existing thing. It is the intentional and oth-
erwise unnecessary destruction of this value that cannot be justified,
however severely or painfully we may punish the evil defendant.
The second argument, that a life sentence, as opposed to the
penalty of death, can become undeserved over time is interesting, but
can be seen as misleading if not mistaken. A prisoner at age sixty,
defies quantification, but they deserved no less punishment than death."). The
argument herein is compatible with imposing any degree of suffering or pain
the courts rightly think appropriate.
144. For thorough documentation, see Deborah W. Denno, Getting to Death:
Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 IowA L. REv. 319 (1997). For discussion
of the jurisprudential concerns of Justices Marshall and Brennan, see Michael
Mello, Adhering To Our Views: Justices Brennan and Marshall and the Re-
lentless Dissent to Death as a Punishment, 22 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 592 (1995).
145. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
146. See Van den Haag, Refuting Reiman and Nathanson, supra note 133, at
172; HEGEL, supra note 120, at 71.
THE DEATH PENALTY
who has served forty years of a life sentence for a murder committed
at age nineteen may not have much in common with his former self
at age nineteen. 147 He or she may be, in significant respects, a differ-
ent person. In a sense, therefore, a person is being punished for the
crimes of another.
Of course, the problems of personal identity and the continuity
thereof can be daunting.' 48 It is not clear which elements of one's
identity must change, and by how much, before one does not deserve
to be punished for the actions of one's largely different former self.
It seems there is enough continuity of identity over time to conclude
that no injustice is done by continued imprisonment many years after
the crime. We are in no hurry to consider whether accused Nazi war
criminals are the relevantly same persons forty years after their
crimes.
On the other hand, some persons seem to change more funda-
mentally in five years than others do in forty. This shows that Van
den Haag cannot rely on the objective passage of time in addressing
issues of desert and the lapse of desert.' 49 Suppose someone seemed
a genuinely different person two or three years after murdering an-
other person. Does the logic of identity really require the prisoner's
release in such a case?
Professor ,Van den Haag may or may not be wrong about the
logic of identity and desert over the passage of time. He may be cor-
rect in that regard, but the relatively prompt execution of the defen-
dant as a genuine solution to the problem of reduced desert over time
is nevertheless objectionable. No doubt executing the defendant ef-
fectively moots the problem, but it still remains problematic.
If we execute a murderer, we may, on Van den Haag's own
logic, simply be preventing the murderer from developing into a per-
son who does not deserve to be punished, let alone executed. If life
imprisonment becomes undeserved over time, the prisoner eventually
might not have deserved to be executed had he not been executed.
Of course, in this case, there is no one around to be unjustly treated,
and in that sense there is no injustice. But that is only because we
147. See id. at 172-73.
148. See, e.g., Amelie 0. Rorty, Introduction, in THE IDENTITIES OF
PERSONS 1-15 (Amelie 0. Rorty ed., 1976).
149. See Van den Haag, supra, note 146, at 173.
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have intentionally blocked any growth and change of the criminal's
identity by killing him. It is not as though an executed person re-
fuses to mature over time. The logic of continuing personal identity
is mysterious enough so that murderers have a moral right to be re-
leased in a few years if they seem to have significantly changed.
Finally, Van den Haag's third argument that in some cases, the
death penalty is deserved and not too severe is worth noting.' 50 The
claim of desert is not one that we need contest.' 5' The question of
whether the death penalty is too severe is central to the emotions and
politics of the death penalty. Many death penalty advocates believe
that life imprisonment is less severe than the death penalty'5 2 and
that death, as opposed to life imprisonment, can therefore be the ap-
propriate penalty in some cases. Professor Van den Haag speaks for
many in holding that "[t]o believe that capital punishment is too se-
vere for any act, one must believe that there can be no act horrible
enough to deserve death."'
15 3
Of course, this argument largely just re-raises the issues of des-
ert, which are morally overridable for reasons discussed previ-
ously.' 54 The death penalty may never be too severe, in the sense of
more than the condemnee deserves. The basic fallacy, however, lies
in assuming that if we start with some serious crime and then con-
tinue to add to the vileness, reprehensibility, or harm of the crime,
we must eventually reach a point at which capital punishment be-
comes not only deserved, and in that sense not too severe, but mor-
ally permissible in all other respects as well. Rather than reiterate a
response, the severity of a punishment, and its proportion to the un-
derlying offense, should be thoroughly contemplated.
It is often overlooked, because the variety among "life" sen-
tences 5 5 and our cruel and unusual punishment jurisprudence'
56
150. See supra notes 141-42.
151. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
152. But see John Stuart Mill, Speech in Favor of Capital Punishment, in
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON PUNISHMENT 271, 272 (Gertrude Ezorsky
ed., 1972).
153. VAN DEN HAAG & CONRAD, supra note 133, at 454.
154. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
155. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror
Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 4 (1993) (noting that ju-
rors' incorrect assumptions as to early release of putative "life" sentence pris-
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leads to the result that the choice between a life sentence and the
death penalty has little to do with the severity of the penalty actually
inflicted. No doubt most defendants would prefer a life term, as it is
currently served, to the death penalty, as it is currently carried out.
No doubt the fear of death is deep and pervasive.'1 7 But this does
not show that no life sentence is more severe than any standard death
penalty, by a defendant's judgment. Thus, there are no grounds for
assuming that all life sentences will be less severe than death.
Admittedly, it is hard to know precisely how to measure the se-
verity of a penalty. One complication is that an interminably delayed
execution may involve additional suffering and may begin to resem-
ble a life sentence. One could argue as well that a defendant who
painlessly and unexpectedly assassinates a political figure suffers far
more than his victim, given his conscious appreciation of the loom-
ing, unknown date of his execution." 8 More importantly, though,
there seem to be extremely wide variations in the severity of a life
sentence.
In fact, merely knowing that a defendant has been sentenced to
life-assuming that a genuine life term is imposed--tells little about
the severity or degree of suffering associated with the life sentence.
Life sentences can vary remarkably in the degree of severity and suf-
fering involved. A life sentence could, for example, involve any
conditions, whether deemed cruel and unusual or not,' 9 allowing the
convicted defendant to retain consciousness, self-consciousness,
identity, capacity for premeditation, deliberation, and free will.
oners as affecting some death penalty decisions). For a more general discus-
sion of what might be called the broad family of life term sentences, see Julian
H. Wright, Jr., Note, Life Without Parole: An Alternative To Death or Not
Much of a Life At All?, 43 VAND. L. REv. 529 (1990). For an interesting spe-
cific proposal, see David McCord, Imagining a Retributivist Alternative to
Capital Punishment, 50 FLA. L..REV. 1, 130-31 (1998).
156. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Stanford v. Ken-
tucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
157. But see Phaedo, in PLATO, EUTHYPHRO, APOLOGY, CRITO, AND
PHAEDO 69 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1988).
158. For a discussion of the unique quality of anticipating a fixed date of
execution, see VICTOR HuGo, THE LAST DAYS OF A CONDEMNED MAN: AND
OTHER PRISON WRITINGS (Geoff Woolen ed., 1992).
159. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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The idea of a life sentence is thus compatible with a wide vari-
ety of conditions. In theory, a life sentence could be served in richly
subsidized Napoleonic fashion, on a well-populated tropical island
paradise. The distinction between guard and servant could be
blurred. Such a sentence would be considered insufficiently severe.
But one can imagine life sentences served in a dramatically different
fashion.
One can, for example, envision a life sentence served in solitary
confinement in its entirety. The theory would be that a deliberate act
of murder shows one to be incapable of functioning acceptably in
any society. The murderer may be deemed to have deliberately re-
jected the requirements of sociability. The convicted defendant's in-
capacity to function in any society-including amongst guards and
fellow inmates-may be permanent. There is thus both poetic justice
and a certain functional logic in holding such a person to either be
incapable of, to have rejected, or to be undeserving of, further social
contact. Solitary confinement may also succeed in conveying to the
murderer a sense of the value of other persons' lives. Such lessons
are more likely to be actually learned over a full lifetime of solitude
than during the pendency of one's own execution. Solitary confine-
ment mirrors and responds to the underlying solipsism of murder.
In theory, solitary confinement could, if otherwise appropriate,
be imposed only up until it resulted in the substantial destruction of
the identity, self-consciousness, or free will of the prisoner. At that
point, perhaps the life-term prisoner in solitary confinement could be
allowed a degree of "virtual" reality or interactive Internet access,
just short of any risk of harm to any other persons. It should soon be
technologically possible to reduce the risk posed by an inmate to
guards, doctors, and other inmates to near zero. This possibility by
itself weighs against the death penalty.16
0
160. Particularly with new cybertechnologies, more sophisticated restraint
devices, and the reduction and spreading of the cost thereof, the social danger
of an inmate sentenced to solitary confinement can approach a vanishing point.
The courts have held that a defendant's minimal dangerousness in prison
counts as a mitigating factor in capital cases. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Caro-
lina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986) ("[E]vidence that the defendant would not pose a
danger if spared (but incarcerated) must be considered potentially mitigat-
ing.").
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It is certainly possible to argue that because solitary confinement
is really a matter of degree, some degrees of solitary confinement
may, independent of our "consciousness" criterion, amount to cruel
and unusual punishments. If thumbscrews, floggings, or the torture
rack are considered cruel and unusual,' 61 so too may the more ex-
treme forms of solitary confinement.' 62 Perhaps at least some ver-
sions of solitary confinement, apart from our consciousness criterion,
become cruel and unusual at such an early point that they cannot be
appropriate punishments for murder.
These considerations make it inherently difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to answer the broader problem of identifying a cruel and unusual
punishment. The death penalty advocate has carved out a thin, if not
entirely nonexistent, slice of the possibilities in this respect. Under
such a view, the death penalty is not thought cruel and unusual, but
any other sentence is either cruel and unusual or is insufficient pun-
ishment, if not both.
Realistically, the death penalty advocate must argue that a life
term with a given level of solitary confinement is insufficient pun-
ishment, but that the same life term with only a minimal change in
the terms or severity of the solitary confinement--say, somewhat
less contact with guards or less television-is cruel and unusual.
This is odd, because both insufficiency of punishment and exces-
siveness of punishment are largely about the degree of severity of the
161. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 at 272-73 (Brennan, J., con-
curring); O'Neil v. State, 144 U.S. 323, 339 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting).
162. See Smith v. Shettle, 946 F.2d 1250, 1252 (7th Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.)
("Subject only to such restraints as the cruel and unusual punishments clause
of the Eighth Amendment may place upon the severity of the punishment, a
state can confine a prisoner as closely as it wants, in solitary confinement if it
wants; a prisoner has no natural liberty to mingle with the general prison
population."); Wallace v. Robinson, 940 F.2d 243, 247 (7th Cir. 1991) (en
banc) ("[T]he cruel and unusual punishments clause of the [e]ighth
[a]mendment ... would have something to say about unending solitary con-
finement even if state rules gave the warden complete discretion over the sub-
ject."); Porth v. Farrier, 934 F.2d 154, 157 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying a totality
of circumstances approach in determining whether a prison official's conduct"was so inhumane, base or barbaric so as to shock the sensibilities" thus vio-
lating the Eighth Amendment) (quoting Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137
(8th Cir. 1989)); Foulds v. Corley, 833 F.2d 52, 54 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding
that violation of the Eighth Amendment could occur by forcing a prisoner to
sleep on the floor of a cold, rat-infested solitary confinement cell).
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punishment under the circumstances. Yet one form of punishment is
supposedly insufficient, while virtually the same punishment with
only minor changes must be thought cruel and unusual by the death
penalty advocate, lest it be recognized as just severe enough. Why
does every adequate form of isolating a sociopath shock the con-
science, 163 where execution does not?
In general, death penalty advocates should concede that some
forms of solitary confinement can amount to a literal death of soci-
ety, while still "teaching" the offender whatever lesson society may
wish to impart more effectively than would the offender's physical or
mental death. Such alternatives to the death penalty can involve the
socially gratifying imposition of as much pain and suffering on the
defendant as society wishes, consistent with the Eighth Amend-
ment.164 Some alternatives to the immediate or even the delayed
163. See, e.g., Porth, 934 F.2d at 157. It is certainly true that many oppo-
nents of capital punishment have objected to the ostracism or social isolation
of the murderer, on the grounds that this form of punishment somehow unjusti-
fiably severs the bonds of community between the murderer and the rest of so-
ciety. See, e.g., Brian Calvert, Retribution, Arbitrariness and the Death Pen-
alty, 23 J. Soc. PHIL. 140, 158 (1992) (arguing that extreme forms of social
isolation are potentially brutalizing and akin to torture); Andrew Oldenquist,
An Explanation of Retribution, 85 J. PHIL. 464, 470 (1988) ("[W]hat a moral
community communicates to criminals by punishing them is that they still be-
long to the community, they are still members."); Robert A. Pugsley, A Re-
tributivist Argument Against Capital Punishment, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1501,
1516 (1981) ("[C]apital punishment is ostracization to the ultimate degree. It
... insuperably destroys those bonds of community which criminal punish-
ment should strive to reaffirm."); Leon Sheleff, The Death Penalty: Response,
25 ISRAEL L. REv. 512, 521 (1991) (discussing lengthy solitary confinement
as potentially undermining "human dignity and social decency"). One can
only reiterate that the state's proof of premeditated murder shows that the de-
fendant is capable of the conscious exercise of free will, but it also suggests the
defendant's lack of minimum basic skills and values underlying social interac-
tion. This suggests that much of the murderer's future interaction should, for
various reasons, be "virtual" rather than "real." By way of analogy, the most
reprehensible drunk drivers need not be reunited with the driving community.
No strong moral imperative exists in judicially denying a murderer's rejection
of, or incapability of living up to, basic social requirements.
164. The imposition of pain and suffering is constrained by the Eighth
Amendment, but our collective standards of decency can presumably devolve
as well as evolve over time. Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 242 (1972)
(stating that it is unlikely society would consistently characterize its shared de-
sire for the official infliction of pain); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
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execution of the offender can match or exceed execution in the de-
gree of constitutionally permissible pain and suffering imposed on
the offender.
IV. A FINAL CAVEAT: FREE WILL AND THE PARADOX OF
MITIGATION IN PRACTICE
In developing the abolitionist position, the astonishment of fa-
miliar capacities, such as consciousness, self-consciousness, con-
tinuous personal identity, and freedom of the will, have been empha-
sized, whether used for good or evil. In the actual litigation of a
death penalty case, some of these capacities may be disputed and
others taken for granted. We certainly can imagine an insanity de-
fense that calls into question the defendant's continuing personal
identity, but this will be unusual. It is more common for defense
counsel to deny the accused's freedom of the will at the time of the
offense. This may take the form of an alleged complete defense,
such as duress, 65 necessity,'66 or other forms of insanity. 67 More
interestingly, though, defense counsel may seek to deny or diminish
the accused's free will as a potential mitigating factor to avoid the
death penalty.
The idea in such cases is to show that nature or social and fa-
milial background circumstances have undercut the accused's free-
dom of will. Even if the necessary mens rea for the charged offense
can be shown, the accused's moral responsibility or blameworthi-
ness is, in such a case, somehow diminished. It is therefore arguably
(stating society's desire for official pain is inconsistent and can change over
time). A society is unlikely, in any event, to consistently characterize its own
shared desire for the official infliction of pain as an instance of moral back-
wardness.
165. See, e.g., United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 409-11 (1980); Joshua
Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse and Searching
For lts ProperLimits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (1989).
166. See, e.g., Bailey, 444 U.S. at 409-11; People v. Raszler, 169 Cal. App.
3d 1160, 1163-66, 215 Cal. Rptr. 770, 772-74 (1985); State v. Moe, 24 P.2d
638, 639-40 (Wash. 1933); see also WRIGHT, supra note 77, at ch. 3 (1996).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 97-98 (1978); WAYNE
K. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW 302-483 (2d ed.
1986) (considering insanity and other defenses); JOSHUA DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 289-317 (1987).
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inappropriate to sentence the accused to death. 161 Under typ-
ical capital sentencing statutes, some of the most significant miti-
gating factors169 are those often thought to minimize the defen-
dant's freedom of will and responsibility. The courts have been, in a
limited sense, receptive to such evidence. 170  Also, jurors may be
168. See, e.g., Anthony V. Alfieri, Mitigation, Mercy, and Delay: The Moral
Politics of Death Penalty Abolitionists, 31 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325, 327
(1996) ("During the penalty or sentencing phase of capital trials, lawyers pres-
ent mitigating evidence of client psycho-social deprivation to the jury in an at-
tempt to explain specific violent acts of criminal lawbreaking and, thus, invite
mercy."); id. at 333 ("Victimization theory provides defense counsel with a
causal, determinist explanation of the defendant's crime."); Austin Sarat,
Bearing Witness and Writing History in the Struggle Against Capital Punish-
ment, 8 YALE J.L. & HuMAN. 451, 457 (1996) (stating that in such "bad struc-
tures rather than bad agents" narratives, "the criminal himself is often por-
trayed as a victim. . ."); see also Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death
Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996) (maintaining that
judges and juries will not condemn someone whom they view as another hu-
man being); Austin Sarat, Violence, Representation, and Responsibility in
Capital Trials: The View from the Jury, 70 IND. L.J. 1103 (1995). For general
background, see Death Penalty: Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances,
104 HARV. L. REv. 139 (1990); Marc D. Hauser, Comment, Capital Mitigation
Evidence in the Seventh Circuit, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 1129 (1998).
169. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a) (1998) (listing impaired capacity, duress,
and "severe mental or emotional disturbance" among mitigating factors to be
considered); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (Deering 1998) (listing "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance," "extreme duress" or "substantial domina-
tion," "mental disease or defect," intoxication, and the defendant's age); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 921.141(6) (West 1997) (listing similar mitigating circum-
stances); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-1(c) (West 1998) (listing "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance" not rising to the level of a defense and "com-
pulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily
harmf'); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4(B) (Michie 1997) (listing "extreme
mental or emotional disturbance," capacity impairment, age, and mental retar-
dation).
170. See, e.g., Blystone v. Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299 (1990) (requiring
capital sentencing jury to hear all relevant and potentially mitigating evidence);
Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 382 (1990) (referring to the belief that "de-
fendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged
background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than
defendants who have no such excuse"); California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541
(1987) ("[T]he capital defendant generally must be allowed to introduce any
relevant mitigating evidence .... "); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115
(1982) ("Evidence of... emotional disturbance is typically introduced.., in
mitigation."); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978) (requiring considera-
tion of "any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circum-
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more or less sympathetic to such claims of reduced blameworthi-
ness. 171
The capacities for consciousness and self-consciousness, as well
as for freedom of the will, are of immense and incomparable value,
and the value of their preservation argues against the death penalty.
There are certainly cases in which the attorney for the accused
should argue for an acquittal or for mitigation based on the absence
or insufficiency of such free will.172 But seeking to undercut the cli-
ent's free will, in a capital sentencing hearing, involves certain risks.
Some have observed that the defendants actually sentenced to
death "are a far cry from the rational agents of Kant's metaphysical
imagination."' 73 In particular, "many of those condemned to die are
stances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death"); United States v. Pullen, 89 F.3d 368, 371 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[T]he
more the crime can be made to seem the inevitable consequence of circum-
stances external to the defendant's character, or rather the more the defendant's
character can be made to seem the product of external circumstances-the less
responsible the defendant can be made to seem.... ."). By way of concrete ex-
ample, consider Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987) (admitting
evidence that defendant, as a child, had the habit of inhaling gasoline fumes
that resulted in lack of concentration, and other negative considerations); see
also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, The Constitutional Regulation of
Capital Punishment Since Furman v. Georgia, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J. 971, 975
(1997) (referring to the requirement that a sentencer in a capital case "con-
sider[] all potentially mitigating aspects of the person's crime, character and
background").
171. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital
Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1538, 1538 (1998) (noting
that jurors surveyed found age, retardation, and other responsibility-
diminishing factors as mitigating circumstances); Valerie P. Hans, How Juries
Decide Death: The Contributions of the Capital Jury Project, 70 IND. L.J.
1233 (1995); James Luginbuhl & Julie Howe, Discretion in Capital Sentencing
Instructions: Guided or Misguided?, 70 IND. L.J. 1161, 1174 (1995) (noting
that forty-three percent of jurors surveyed believed incorrectly that the law re-
quired a death sentence upon a showing of the defendant's future
dangerousness); Peter Meijes Tiersma, Dictionaries and Death: Do Capital
Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1, 2 ("[T]here are dis-
turbing indications that jurors do not adequately understand instructions on
mitigation in death penalty cases.").
172. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 77, at ch. 3 (arguing that the logical
scope of the necessity defense encompasses more than the narrow scope cur-
rently recognized).
173. Hugo Adam Bedau, How to Argue About the Death Penalty, 25 ISRAEL
L. REV. 466, 479 (1991).
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mentally ill, mentally retarded, or were children at the time of the of-
fense."'174 Drawing the jury's attention away from a locus of argua-
bly immense value within persons does not guarantee avoidance of
the death penalty.
Thus, downplaying whatever freedom of will the defendant may
have possessed involves substantial risks. The basic problem is that
a mitigating circumstance "[m]ay be in the eye of the beholder."'175
What the law intends to be mitigating, the jury may actually treat as
aggravating. 176 At the very least, what the law intends as mitigating
may be inseparable from some factor the jury treats as aggravating.
In this connection, Judge Easterbrook has observed that "jurors may
not be impressed with the idea that to know the cause of viciousness
is to excuse it; they may conclude instead that, when violent behavior
appears to be outside the defendant's power of control, capital pun-
ishment is appropriate to incapacitate.',
177
Broadly speaking, for example, the law may consider the condi-
tion of youthful immaturity as a mitigating condition. 178 Even so, a
jury may still conclude that a youthful offender is especially danger-
ous because of his youth.179 The tactic of minimizing the defen-
dant's freedom of will, however appropriate, may thus backfire.
With regard to a condemnee diagnosed as a child with organic brain
174. Stephen B. Bright, Death Penalty Moratorium: Fairness, Integrity at
Stake, 13 CRIM. JUST. 28, 29 (1998). This is, of course, not to argue that per-
sons with limited free will are not themselves of immense and incomparable
value. By assumption, such value may be ascribed to their capacities for con-
sciousness, self-consciousness, or continuing personal identity.
175. See Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 794 (1987) (citing Stanley v. Zant,
697 F.2d 955, 969 & n.ll (1lth Cir. 1983)).
176. See, e.g., Emerson v. Gramley, 91 F.3d 898, 906 (7th Cir. 1996) ("The
narratives that defense counsel and their 'mitigation specialists' present often
contain material that the jury is likely to consider aggravating rather than miti-
gating.") (quoting Burger, 483 U.S. at 793); Joshua N. Sondheimer, Note, A
Continuing Source ofAggravation: The Improper Consideration of Mitigating
Factors in Death Penalty Sentencing, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 409, 410 (1989-1990)
("[J]urors may view certain mitigating factors as factors aggravating the grav-
ity of a capital crime.").
177. Burris v. Parke, 130 F.3d 782, 784-85 (7th Cir. 1997).
178. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West 1999) (listing age as a pos-
sible mitigating factor); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (Michie 1997).
179. See, e.g., Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 368 (1993); Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 475-76 (1993).
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damage180 and an IQ of between fifty and sixty-three,' 8' the Supreme
Court has observed that the defendant's "mental retardation and his-
tory of abuse is ... a two-edged sword: it may diminish his blame-
worthiness for his crime even as it indicates that there is a probability
that he will be dangerous in the future."'182 Under current penologi-
cal practice, a prosecutor plausibly can argue for the defendant's fu-
ture dangerousness even if sentenced to a life term' 83
This is not to suggest that defense counsel should exaggerate the
freedom of will and rational autonomy of their clients at sentencing
hearings. Often, the opposite strategy is well-advised. Typically,
however, the jury is already committed to the belief, expressed in
their verdict at the guilt phase of the trial, that the defendant's crimi-
nal act was undertaken with deliberation and premeditation.
8 4
Whether a typical jury will actually find the defendant's free will and
other capacities to be worth preserving is doubtful. Nevertheless,
there are serious risks as well as potential benefits in a strategy of
180. See Pery v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 307 (1989) (plurality opinion); cf
Rector v. Bryant, 501 U.S. 1239, 1239 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting from
denial of certiorari) (arguing that certiorari should be granted to determine the
competency of a condemned prisoner where the condemnee's mental incapac-
ity renders him "unable to recognize or communicate facts that would make his
sentence unlawful or unjust").
181. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 307. Here, we are merely assuming that such
scores, whether or not valid as measures of generalized intelligence, indicate
some diminution of free will and culpability. Whether this is true need not be
addressed.
182. Id. at324.
183. See id. at 323-24 ("Even in a prison setting, the prosecutor argued,
Pery could hurt doctors, nurses, librarians, or teachers who worked in
prison."); see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 n.5 (1994)
(plurality opinion) ("[T]hat a defendant is parole ineligible does not prevent the
State from arguing that the defendant poses a future danger. The State is free
to argue that the defendant will pose a danger to others in prison and that exe-
cuting him is the only means of eliminating the threat to the safety of other in-
mates or prison staff.").
On the merits, it is worth recalling the above discussion of the possible
varieties of solitary confinement under life imprisonment. See supra notes
144-49 and accompanying text Some forms of solitary confinement, particu-
larly in an era of advanced communication and restraint technologies, pose
risks to the safety of other persons no more than roughly equal to those posed
by a prisoner condemned to execution. In reality, the safety of other persons
does not provide any inescapable reason for preferring the penalty of death.
184. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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minimizing, at the sentencing phase, any freedom of will the defen-
dant may be capable of exercising.
V. CONCLUSION
In present society, imposition of the death penalty should be ex-
cluded on moral grounds. The death penalty is not more suitable
than any other available penalty, even for the worst crimes, and the
degree of pain and suffering and message-conveying involved in a
punishment is uncorrelated with whether the punishment involves
death. Even if it could be shown, however, that the death penalty
was the uniquely deserved punishment in at least one case, that
would not validate the death penalty. It is clear that the imposition of
even the most deserved penalties can be overridden on independent
moral grounds. Reliance on any claim of unfairness, injustice, or
rights violation is unnecessary.
Further, retnbution in the case of the death penalty is always
overridden by the incomparable value of each unique individual con-
sciousness, along with other profoundly mysterious, familiar, and
commonly shared capacities for self-consciousness, continuity of
personal identity, and free will. To convict a defendant of any seri-
ous crime is to concede the existence of these capacities, however
maliciously they were employed on the occasion of the offense.
The general argument could be rebutted, or amplified, at almost
any point. Instead of prematurely seeking closure, three points that
are of as much emotional as theoretical interest should be noted. The
first is a response to an estoppel argument that is founded upon the
idea that the typical convict has freely chosen to murder someone. Is
such a person really in any position to complain about harshness or
even immorality in sentencing? Wouldn't any complaint about the
sentence of death also implicitly condemn the defendant's own con-
duct? 8 5
The answer is that the condemnee in such a case is indeed in no
position to complain. It is simply not plausible to condemn capital
punishment, but not the typical murder. The murderer has, in this
sense, no standing to object. But this does not end the moral inquiry.
185. See TOM SORRELL, MORAL THEORY AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 151
(1987) (discussing the theory of Immanuel Kant).
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The scope of moral obligation belonging to a conscientious citizenry
is not dictated by the scope of an alleged victim's personal right to
complain. An executed pickpocket could simply have refrained from
picking the pocket. That fact, however, would not legitimize the
penalty.
The second point addresses the value of a single human life. It
is clear enough that in most contexts, a human life has less than infi-
nite value.' 86 Such implicit valuations of human life may vary only
arbitrarily. 8 7 But saving any life may not be worth paying any price.
Workplace safety rules, airline travel policies, highway design rules,
the permissibility of war, and the legal and moral tolerance of risky
leisure activities all testify to this assertion.' 88
By way of response, principled opposition to the death penalty
does not imply that life expectancy should always be maximized.
Life's essential measures consist of more than mere duration. Inten-
tionally taking the life of another person is generally unjustified, ex-
cept in cases where it is clear that an innocent life or great bodily
harm hangs in the balance. 189 Even in such a case, there must be a
186. See Robert Holyer, Capital Punishment and the Sanctity of Life, 34 INT.
PHIL. Q. 485, 497 (1994) ("[I]t is clear that we do not regard human life as of
infinite value.").
187. See generally W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS (1992) (noting the
truly remarkable range of variation in statistical lives saved annually per unit
of cost by various sorts of rules and regulatory schemes).
188. For general background, see Charles Fried, The Value ofLife, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1415 (1969) (discussing, inter alia, the problem of valuing lives in
immediate, concrete peril as opposed to remote, statistical lives). For back-
ground on the "Just War" theory, see JENNY TEICHMAN, PACIFISM AND THE
JUST WAR (1986); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL
ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS (1992). For philosophical dis-
cussion of self-defense, see SUZANNE UNIACKE, PERMISSIBLE KILLING: THE
SELF-DEFENCE JUSTIFICATION OF HOMICIDE (1994); Claire Oakes Finkelstein,
On the Obligation of the State to Extend a Right of Self-Defense to Its Citizens,
147 U. PA. L. REv. 1361 (1999).
189. It is assumed that the debate over any unique deterrent power of the
death penalty, as opposed to all other possible penalties, cannot resolve the
capital punishment debate. See authorities cited supra note 7. Even in main-
tamining the self-defense analogy, a plea may be unacceptable where the claim is
merely that killing someone will probably save some limited number of lives
down the line, as the deterrence theorist might argue. Of course, the closer we
move to broadly utilitarian calculations, or to allowing deliberate killing so as
to minimize the overall death rate, the harder it becomes to rule out capital
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showing of a reasonable belief that killing the aggressor is genuinely
necessary to save the life that is being defended. 190 One cannot, for
example, kill an aggressor that one clearly has the power to disarm.
Similarly, the government cannot morally execute an offender that it
has the power to render harmless through punishments other than
death.' 9' Where lesser, but no less effective, means of social self-
defense are available, they must be used.
This leads to the third and final concern. The life of a deliberate
murderer is not an innocent life, nor, arguably, even like that of a
soldier in the service of unprovoked aggression. Murderers and their
innocent victims are not on a behavioral par. As has been asked in
another context, can't moral judgments be made? 192  Or as one
prominent defender of the death penalty has asked,
[W]hat sort of humanism is it that respects equally the life
of Thomas Jefferson and Charles Manson, Abraham Lin-
coln and Adolf Eichmann, Martin Luther King and James
Earl Ray? To say that these men, some great and some un-
speakably vile, equally possess human dignity is to demon-
strate an inability to make a moral judgment derived from
or based on the idea of human dignity. 193
punishment or for that matter, to establish any inviolable moral rule at all. But
as of yet most persons would not consistently endorse a broad utilitarianism of
killing. For general discussion, see Germain Grisez, Against Consequential-
ism, 23 AM. J. JURIs. 21 (1978).
190. See generally Taylor v. State, 710 N.E.2d 921, 924 (Ind. 1999) (af-
fining that defendant did not meet burden showing he had a "reasonable be-
lief that deadly force was necessary to prevent serious bodily injury to himself
or a third person"); Allen v. City of Atlanta, 510 S.E.2d 64, 65 (Ga. 1998)
(citing a Georgia statute); State v. Johnson, 954 P.2d 79, 85 (N.M. 1998). It is
sometimes held that self-defense must not only appear to be reasonably neces-
sary, but that the threatened harm must be imminent. Any such requirement
will not be relied upon, despite its relevance to the logic of capital punishment,
because it is far from clear that the imminence requirement is itselfjustifiable.
191. As an admittedly odd hypothetical case, consider that a government
probably lacks the moral authority to kill even an aggressive invading army if,
miraculously, the press of a button would instantly and permanently transfer
that invading army to a secure prison. We abstract away from many compli-
cations, of course, in reaching such a conclusion.
192. See MARY MIDGLEY, CAN'T WE MAKE MORAL JUDGMENTS? (1991).
193. WALTER BERNS, FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: CRIME AND THE
MORALITY OF THE DEALTH PENALTY 163 (1979).
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In response, reliance upon human dignity is not elucidating,
largely because of its normativity, murkiness, and ambiguity. In
contrast, we have direct experience of our own consciousness and we
at least have the direct subjective impression of our own freedom of
will. 194 Direct subjective impression of our own dignity as persons,
however, is not similarly possible. And technically, there has been
no reliance on any claim that persons who are sufficiently self-
conscious must be self-conscious in equal degree. Self-
consciousness itself is astounding and deeply inexplicable, and hav-
ing more self-consciousness than another person does not change
that basic fact.
Lincoln and Manson were equally conscious and free agents. If
they were also not equal in their degrees of consciousness and free
agency, they were, in any event, both plainly above the threshold
level that matters. Or if Manson was not, this result can hardly be
welcomed by the death penalty advocate who depends on a finding
of some sufficient mens rea for execution in the first place.
Lincoln and Manson were hardly equal in virtue, in criminal in-
nocence, in benevolence, or moral admirability. There is a clear and
important sense in which their lives are not deserving of equal re-
spect. They were equal in certain important respects, and wildly
unequal in others. The latter criteria are undeniably of enormous
moral significance. History will not judge Lincoln and Manson as
moral peers, as long as judgments of moral character continue to be
made.
Certainly, the moral deserts of Lincoln and Manson were very
different. But not everything that the state distributes, including life
and death, should be distributed on the basis of virtue, character, or
moral desert. Moral desert does not exhaust all moral considerations,
and is subject to being overridden, as shown previously. 195 More
194. For the view that this subjective experience, however vivid, may be
misleading, see B.F. SKInNER, ABOUT BEHAVIORISM 217-18, 197-98 (1974).
Of course, Skinner in particular would not be inclined to suggest .that we dis-
pense with the illusion of free will, but then cling to traditional understandings
of human dignity. See generally B.F. SKInNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND
DIGNITY (1971).
195. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
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broadly, not all good and bad things should be distributed in accor-
dance with the single criterion of moral desert.196 Penicillin is prop-
erly allocated, not in accordance with moral desert, but medical need.
While the allocation of criminal punishment normally hinges on des-
ert, the death penalty is a bit more complicated as discussed above.
Execution destroys far more that is of profound moral value than
other, perhaps equally or more severe punishment.
At this point, the death penalty advocate may be excused for
impatience. Death may indeed be different. But the death penalty
advocate may respond that Hitler, at least, was also radically differ-
ent. Would any kind of prison sentence, even a genuine life term, be
truly fitting, suitable, and somehow proportionately equivalent to the
crimes against humanity Hitler committed?
It is certainly right to say that a standard life term is not in any
sense fitting, suitable, or proportionate in the case of Hitler. We
must ask, however, whether any standard sort of death sentence
would be fitting, suitable, or proportionate. The best approach may
be to admit that neither the death penalty nor a life term would be
appropriate. The retributive paradigm, and perhaps the idea of legal
punishment itself, breaks down in the case of Hitler.
The death penalty advocate might finally say that in any event,
whatever Hitler might have really deserved, he deserved no less than
the death penalty. In response, the theory of punishment can ac-
commodate punishments that are admittedly not fitting or propor-
tionate, but that are clearly no more severe than the unspecifiably de-
served punishment. But could it not be equally reasonable to say that
Hitler instead deserved no less than some sort of extremely pro-
longed physical or mental torment consistent with consciousness
over time? Both forms of punishment may be morally inadequate,
but why is perpetual conscious torment, in whatever form, necessar-
ily more inadequate? The punitive possibilities are limited only by
morality and the penological imagination. In any event, it is plausi-
ble that death would be too good for Hitler. Other non-death penal-
ties might be a bit less "too good" for Hitler.
196. See generally MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 3-6 (1983)
(stating that different goods have different appropriate distributional criteria).
